

[REDACTED]

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON, NO. 137, (CONTINUED)

TO WHAT EXTENT AND WITH WHAT EQUIPMENT IT WILL BE LOADED WILL BE
DETERMINED AFTER PRESENT MOVEMENT STARTS. AVAILABILITY OF
AIRCRAFT, PILOTS AND THE TIME OF TURN AROUND WILL ALL DETERMINE
LOAD AND DESTINATION OF SECOND TRIP, IF IT IS MADE PARAGRAPH
AVG FOR THE TIME BEING HAS A TOTAL OF TWO FOUR SEVEN AIRPLANES
ALREADY AT KARACHI OR EAST OF KARACHI OR ENROUTE BY AIR OR BY
SEA PARAGRAPH I ASSURE YOU THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IS BEING DONE
TO MEET REQUIREMENTS OF AVG IN CHINA AND YOUR FORCES IN INDIA

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1808 April 21, 1942.

J. L. McCREA

JOHN L. McCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date OCT 12 1971

Boyl

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

BOTH THESE WIRES ARE O.K.
AND I THINK THEY SHOULD BE SENT
AT ONCE.

H.L.H.

OK except
one sentence *[initials]*

7.7.12

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

April 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING: (Navy Department)

Subject: Draft of Message for President.

Here is a draft of a message for the President
to the former Naval person.

H. H. Arnold
H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

*Modified as interlined
for essential clarification*

Incl:
Draft of Message to
President.

E.H.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- FEB 14 1972

Signature- *[Signature]*

[REDACTED]

*OK with
corrections in pencil*
[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

Date- FEB 14 1972

Signature- *PHK*

April 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Airplanes to India.

It is suggested that the following telegram be sent to the former naval person in reply to his No. ⁷¹²⁻⁴⁷² dated April 18th.

No. 137 ALL PLANS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED FOR MOVEMENT OF AGREED UPON AIRPLANES TO INDIA AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. PERIOD BAD WEATHER HELD UP ASSEMBLY OF PURSUIT AIRPLANES FOR SHIPMENT ON RANGER BUT THIS MOVEMENT IS COMPLETED AND RANGER SHOULD LEAVE ON TUESDAY APRIL TWENTY FIRST PERIOD YOUR APPROVAL OF THE UTILIZATION OF LIBERATORS PAREN B DASH TWENTY FOUR PAREN MAKES IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO INSTALL ASV EQUIPMENT ON THESE AIRPLANES PRIOR TO MOVEMENT TO INDIA PERIOD THIS WILL PROVE A GREAT HELP IN RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS OVER THE BAY OF BENGAL OR THE INDIAN OCEAN PERIOD SEVEN FLYING FORTRESSES SHOULD LEAVE THE UNITED STATES WITHIN FORTY EIGHT HOURS PERIOD TWENTY FOUR ADDITIONAL LIBERATORS PAREN B DASH TWENTY FOUR PAREN SHOULD LEAVE THE UNITED STATES SHORTLY AFTER MAY TENTH PERIOD THIS DELAY ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE THEM WITH SATISFACTORY NOSE ARMAMENT PERIOD THE TWENTY ONE B DASH TWENTY FIVES WHICH WE TOOK OVER FROM YOU SHOULD LEAVE THE UNITED STATES DURING THE COMING WEEK PERIOD THIS DELAY CAUSED BY ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT NOT ON YOUR AIRPLANES SUCH AS AUTOMATIC PILOTS BEING INSTALLED PRIOR TO THIS MOVEMENT PARA AIRCRAFT CARRIER RANGER WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR FERRYING ^{FURTHER} ^{VIA AFRICA} ADDITIONAL AIRPLANES TO INDIA ON ITS RETURN FROM WEST AFRICA PERIOD TO WHAT EXTENT AND WITH WHAT EQUIPMENT IT WILL BE LOADED WILL BE DETERMINED AFTER PRESENT MOVEMENT STARTS PERIOD AVAILABILITY OF

[REDACTED]

10

AIRCRAFT COMMA PILOTS AND THE TIME OF TURN AROUND WILL ALL DETERMINE
LOAD AND DESTINATION OF SECOND TRIP COMMA IF IT IS MADE PARA AVG FOR
THE TIME BEING HAS A TOTAL OF TWO FOUR SEVEN AIRPLANES ALREADY AT
KARACHI OR EAST OF KARACHI OR EN ROUTE BY AIR OR BY SEA PARA I ASSURE
YOU THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IS BEING DONE TO MEET REQUIREMENTS OF
AVG IN CHINA AND YOUR FORCES IN INDIA

Roosevelt

~~H. H. ARNSOLD~~
~~Lieutenant General, U. S. A.~~
~~Commanding General, Army Air Forces~~

GK
WOT

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- FEB 14 1972

Signature- *BA*

[REDACTED]

APRIL 21, 1942

[REDACTED]
TO: LONDON

NO. 138

[REDACTED] FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT.

REPLYING TO YOUR NUMBER 74, BELIEVE WISER TO LET SITUATION
JELL A LITTLE BEFORE MAKING THE APPROACH YOU SUGGEST. THIS
BUSINESS MUST BE WATCHED WITH THE GREATEST CARE. I WILL CABLE
YOU AGAIN ABOUT IT IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

Roosevelt

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1807 April 21, 1942.

J. L. McCREA
JOHN L. McCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date OCT 12 1971

AEL

CABLEGRAM

AC-4

ALDI 2
120 P

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

MARCH 6, 1942

9:18 A M.

From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 2112 MARCH 6th

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN PARA THE
PRIME MINISTER HAS SHOWN ME HIS CABLE TO YOU IN INDIA PD THERE
IS NO DOUBT HE AND THE WAR CABINET ARE EARNESTLY STRUGGLING TO
FIND A FORMULA THAT WILL BE OF VALUE AT THIS MOMENT AND INTEND
TO TAKE SOME AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PD THE IMPORTANCE OF ACTION IS
RECOGNIZED FOR ITS AFFECT ON OPINION AT HOME CMA IN AMERICA AND
ELSEWHERE QUITE APART FROM INDIAN PARA ALTHOUGH THE PRIME MINISTER
HAS NOT SPECIFICALLY SAID SO CMA I HAVE THE FEELING HE WOULD BE
INTERESTED IN YOUR REACTION PD I AM QUITE SURE THAT IN GILS AB-
SENCE I CAN CONVEY TO HIM WHATEVER YOU MAY HAVE IN MIND WITHOUT
EMBARRASSMENT CMA IF YOU DO NOT WISH TO CABLE HIM DIRECT

MCCLURE

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By BH/ Date MAR 1 1972

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

To

MAY 5 1972

PAGE 2

Copies furnished as noted:

FROM CENTRAL UNION STOP PUNJAB MOSLEMS IF THEY
REMAIN UNITED COULD NO DOUBT ENSURE EXERCISE OF OPTION
TO REMAIN SEPARATE IN CASE OF PUNJAB CMA BUT FOR
FOLLOWING REASONS THEIR OWN COMMUNAL APPREHENSIONS
MUST BE ALLAYED STOP SIKHS WOULD BE ALARMED AT PROS-
PECT OF PREDOMINANTLY MOSLEM AND SEPARATE PUNJAB AND
WOULD BEGIN TO PREPARE THEMSELVES FOR TROUBLE STOP
CERTAINTY OF SUCH TROUBLE ARISING WOULD CAUSE PUNJAB
MOSLEMS TO LOOK TO THEIR OWN DEFENCES STOP IDEA OF
A SEPARATED PUNJAB WOULD THEREFORE STILL KEEP BOTH
SIDES EMBITTERED STOP NUMBER OF ARMS KNOWN TO BE HIDDEN
IN PUNJAB GIVES CAUSE FOR ADDITIONAL ANXIETY STOP
FURTHER INFLAMMATION OF COMMUNAL PASSIONS CAN ONLY
BE PREVENTED BY GUARANTEE THAT WE WILL ENSURE MODER-
ATION AND PEACE EITHER IN A SEPARATE OR FEDERATED
PUNJAB STOP PARA LATEST ROUTINE REPORT FROM GOVERNOR
OF PUNJAB REFERS TO SERIOUS DETERIORATION IN PUBLIC
MORALE AS A RESULT OF BAD NEWS FROM FAR EAST CMA AND
TO GROWING MUTUAL DISTRUST AND STRAIN IN RELATIONS
BETWEEN MOSLEMS AND SIKHS STOP ENDS FOLLOWING IS
TELEGRAM FROM GOVERNOR OF PUNJAB STOP BEGINS
FOLLOWING ARE MY VIEWS ON EFFECT ON PUNJAB OF IMMEDIATE

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

To

PAGE 2

MAY

5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

REST OF INDIA OR AGAINST OWN MINORITIES E G SIKHS QUERY
IN RESULT THE MINDS OF ALL WILL DEFINITELY BE TAKEN OFF
TASK OF FIGHTING OUR ENEMIES CLN AS A SEQUEL RECRUITMENT
WILL BE GRAVELY IMPERILLED STOP SUB PARA B GENERAL TEND-
ENCY WOULD BE TO DISCOURAGE MARTIAL RACES CMA BUT BRING
FORWARD LARGE NUMBERS FROM NON DASH MARTIAL CLASSES WHO
WOULD BE WORTHLESS AGAINST EXTERNAL ENEMIES AND ONLY
DESIRE TO BE ARMED AGAINST INTERNAL ENEMIES STOP IN ANY
CASE IF AS SEEMS PROBABLY CMA WIDESPREAD COMMUNAL DIST-
URBANCES DEVELOP IN INDIA CMA TASK OF SUPPRESSING THEM
WITH INDIAN TROOPS WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE STOP A POSSIBILITY
OF COMMUNAL WARFARE IN INDIAN ARMY CANNOT BE EXCLUDED
STOP SUB PARA C PROBABLE EFFECT ON STATES FORCES NOT
CLEAR STOP SUB PARA D SERVING GURKHAS UNLIKELY TO BE
AFFECTED STOP SUB PARA E EFFECT ON BRITISH OFFICER IS
LIKELY TO BE DISPIRITING WHILE HIS DIFFICULTIES ARE
INCREASED STOP NUMBER OF VOLUNTEERS FOR INDIAN ARMY FROM
ENGLAND IS LIKELY TO DIMINISH STOP PARA THREE SUMMING
UP COMMAND IN CHIEF CONSIDERS THAT GENERALLY EFFECT
OF CONTEMPLATED ANNOUNCEMENT ON FIGHTING SERVICES WOULD
BE DISASTROUS STOP HE IS QUITE CERTAIN CONTEMPLATED ANN-
OUNCEMENT WILL TAKE SOLDIERS MIND SOONER OR LATER OFF

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

To

PAGE 3

Copies furnished as noted:

FIGHTING OUR ENEMIES AND START HIM LOOKING OVER HIS
SHOULDER STOP FINALLY PRESENT TIME WHEN THINGS ARE
GOING WRONG CMA WOULD BE PARTICULARLY UNHAPPY FOR
SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT.

PRIME

Action Copy

AHB
DI2
1238p/7

CABLEGRAM

AC 4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

MARCH 7

805 A M.

From AMEMBASSY LONDON

To POTUS REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 19 MARCH 7th

former NAVAL PERSON TO THE PRESIDENT PERSONAL
AND ~~SECRET~~ NUMBER FORTY PARA IF WINANT IS WITH YOU NOW H
E WILL NO DOUBT EQPLAIN THE FOREIGN OFFICE VIEW ABOUT RUSS
IA STOP THE INCREASING GRAVITY OF THE WAR HAS LED ME TO FE
EL THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ATLANTIC CHARTER OUGHT NOT TO
BE CONSTRUED SO AS TO DENY RUSSIA THE FRONTIERS SHE OCCUPI
ED WHEN GERMANY ATTACKED HER STOP THIS WAS THE BASIS ON WHI
CH RUSSIA ACCEDED TO THE CHARTER CMA AND I EQPECT THAT A S
EVERE PROCESS OF LIQUIDATING HOSTILE ELEMENTS IN THE BALTIC
STATES CMA ETC CMA WAS EMPLOYED BY THE RUSSIANS WHEN THEY
TOOK THESE REGIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR STOP I HOPE
THERE FORE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE US A FREE HAND TO
SIGN THE TREATY WHICH STALIN DESIRES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ST
OP EVERYTHING PORTENDS AN IMMENSE RENEWAL OF THE GERMAN INV
ASION OF RUSSIA IN THE SPRING AND THERE IS VERY LITTLE WE C
AN DO TO HELP THE ONLY COUNTRY THAT IS HEAVILY ENGAGED WITH
THE GERMAN ARMIES STOP PARA TWO WITH REGARD TO YOUR CONV
ERSATION WITH THE STAFFS ABOUT MY LONG TELEGRAM CMA I SHOUL
D LIKE TO TELL YOU CMA FOR YOURSELF ALONE CMA THAT I AM BY
NO MEANS EQCLUDING AN EFFORT FROM HERE TO TAKE THE WEIGHT

Action Copy RUSSIA ONCE HITLER IS DEFINITELY COMMITTED TO THE ATTACK

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

MESSAGE NO. 19 SEVENTH

M.

From

PAGE TWO

To

Copies furnished as noted:

K STOP I DO NOT WANT TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE COMBINED STAF
FS AT ALL AT THE PRESENT TIME STOP I HOPE IT CAN REMAIN SEC
RET BETWEEN US STOP PARA THREE I AM KEEPING YOU INFORMED
ABOUT INDIA SO THAT YOU MAY SEE THE DIFFICULTIES I HAVE TO
FACE STOP THE WEIGHT OF THE WAR IS VERY HEAVY NOW AND I MUS
T EQQPECT IT TO GET STEADILY WORSE FOR SOME TIME TO COME

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

EH
AMD1 22
1009PM/7

CABLEGRAM

AC--4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

MARCH 7, 1942

6:38 P.M.

From AMEMBASSY LONDON

To POTUS WASHN

Copies furnished as noted:

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
by R. H. Parks Date

NO XXXC 20 MARCH SEVENTH

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT PERSONAL AND

MAY 5 1972

~~SECRET~~ NO FORTYONE PD IN PURSUANCE OF MY PLAN OF KEEPING
YOU INFORMED ABOUT OUR INDIAN POLICY AND IN CONTINUATION
OF MY TELEGRAM NO THIRTY NINE IN WHICH I GAVE YOU WAVELLS
VIEWS I NOW SEND YOU A TELEGRAM FROM THE VICEROY CMA
JUST RECEIVED CMA AS WELL AS ONE FROM THE GOVERNOR OF
THE PUNJAB STOP THESE ARE NOT CMA OF COURSE CMA THE
ONLY OPINIONS ON THESE MATTERS CMA BUT THEY ARE VERY
SERIOUS WHEN THE ENEMY IS BATTERING AT THE GATE AND
WHEN THE PUNJAB SUPPLIES FIFTY PER CENT OF ALL FIGHTING
TROOPS WHICH CAN TAKE PART IN DEFENCE OF INDIA STOP WE
ARE STILL PERSEVERING TO FIND SOME CONCILIATORY AND
INSPIRING PROCESS CMA BUT I HAVE TO BE CAREFUL THAT WE
DO NOT DISTURB BRITISH POLITICS AT A MOMENT WHEN THINGS
ARE INCREASINGLY AQUIVER STOP FOLLOWING ARE VICEROYS
COMMENTS WITH RELATION TO WAVELLS APPRECIATION STOP
BEGINS PARA THERE IS DANGER OF COMMUNAL POSITION IN
PUNJAB BEING MISUNDERSTOOD AT HOME AND FOLLOWING CONSIDER-
ATIONS ARE THEREFORE PUT FORWARD WITH PARTICULAR REFER-
ENCE TO PROPOSAL FOR LOCAL OPTION TO REMAIN SEPARATE

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

To

PAGE 2

MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

FROM CENTRAL UNION STOP PUNJAB MOSLEMS IF THEY
REMAIN UNITED COULD NO DOUBT ENSURE EXERCISE OF OPTION
TO REMAIN SEPARATE IN CASE OF PUNJAB CMA BUT FOR
FOLLOWING REASONS THEIR OWN COMMUNAL APPREHENSIONS
MUST BE ALLAYED STOP SIKHS WOULD BE ALARMED AT PROS-
PECT OF PREDOMINANTLY MOSLEM AND SEPARATE PUNJAB AND
WOULD BEGIN TO PREPARE THEMSELVES FOR TROUBLE STOP
CERTAINTY OF SUCH TROUBLE ARISING WOULD CAUSE PUNJAB
MOSLEMS TO LOOK TO THEIR OWN DEFENCES STOP IDEA OF
A SEPARATED PUNJAB WOULD THEREFORE STILL KEEP BOTH
SIDES EMBITTERED STOP NUMBER OF ARMS KNOWN TO BE HIDDEN
IN PUNJAB GIVES CAUSE FOR ADDITIONAL ANXIETY STOP
FURTHER INFLAMMATION OF COMMUNAL PASSIONS CAN ONLY
BE PREVENTED BY GUARANTEE THAT WE WILL ENSURE MODER-
ATION AND PEACE EITHER IN A SEPARATE OR FEDERATED
PUNJAB STOP PARA LATEST ROUTINE REPORT FROM GOVERNOR
OF PUNJAB REFERS TO SERIOUS DETERIORATION IN PUBLIC
MORALE AS A RESULT OF BAD NEWS FROM FAR EAST CMA AND
TO GROWING MUTUAL DISTRUST AND STRAIN IN RELATIONS
BETWEEN MOSLEMS AND SIKHS STOP ENDS FOLLOWING IS
TELEGRAM FROM GOVERNOR OF PUNJAB STOP BEGINS
FOLLOWING ARE MY VIEWS ON EFFECT ON PUNJAB OF IMMEDIATE

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

From _____ REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British _____ M.
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972 [REDACTED]
To _____

PAGE 3

Copies furnished as noted:

DECLARATION THAT INDIA WILL AT FUTURE DATE BE GIVEN
RIGHT TO SECEDE FROM EMPIRE STOP RESPONSIBLE SECTION
OF MOSLEMS WHO ARE MAJORITY HOLD UNSHAKEABLE VIEW
THAT UNTIL CONSTITUTION ACCEPTABLE TO MOSLEM INDIA
IS DEVISED CMA BRITAIN MUST CONTINUE TO HOLD THE ROPES
STOP THEY WILL CERTAINLY BE WORRIED THAT CONSTITUTION
ON LINES CONTEMPLATED WOULD PLACE POWER IN HANDS OF
HINDUS WHOM THEY ALREADY SUSPECT OF PRO DASH JAPANESE
TENDENCIES STOP THEY WILL THEREFORE BE DIVERTED FROM
WORKING FOR DEFENCE OF INDIA AS A WHOLE AND SEEK TO
ALIGN THEMSELVES ELSEWHERE STOP UNPRECEDENTED INTEN-
SIFICATION OF BITTERNESS BETWEEN SIKHS AND MOSLEMS
CMA BETWEEN WHOM RELATIONS ARE ALREADY DANGEROUSLY
STRAINED CMA WILL RESULT STOP ALL COMMUNITIES WILL
WISH TO KEEP THEIR OWN MEN AT HOME TO DEFEND THEIR
OWN INTERESTS AND RECRUITMENT WILL AS A RESULT BE VERY
SERIOUSLY AFFECTED STOP DISORDERS WILL BE INEVITABLE
AND PRESENT GREATLY REDUCED SCALE OF SECURITY TROOPS
LIKELY TO BE INSUFFICIENT STOP MOSLEM LEAGUE WILL
PROBABLY GREATLY INCREASE STRENGTH IN PUNJAB AND
WILL USE INFLUENCE RUTHLESSLY FOR PURPOSE OF DISRUPTION
STOP PRIMER OF PUNJAB WILL PROBABLY RESIGN WITH MOST

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

To

MAY 5 1972

PAGE 4

Copies furnished as noted:

OR ALL OF HIS MINISTERS STOP THIS WOULD HAVE VERY
SERIOUS EFFECT AS NO DASH ONE ELSE COULD HELP IN THE
WAR AND HOLD THE PUNJAB TOGETHER AS PRESENT PREMIER
HAS DONE STOP DECLARATION THAT PROVINCES WILL HAVE
LOCAL OPTION OF ACCEDING TO CENTRAL INDIAN UNION WILL
NOT COUNTERACT EFFECT OF DECLARATION THAT INDIA WILL
HAVE RIGHT TO SECEDE FROM EMPIRE DEALT WITH ABOVE STOP
PUNJAB IS NOT HOMOGENEOUS BUT COMPOSED OF COMMUNITIES
ANTAGONISTIC TO EACH OTHER AND INTERNAL TROUBLE WOULD
BE UNAVOIDABLE STOP PUNJAB WOULD PROBABLY NOT ACCEDE
TO UNION STOP MOSLEM COMMUNITY WOULD TEND TO FORM BLOC
WITH CO DASH RELIGIONIST NEIGHBOURS STOP

PRIME

Action Copy

ETT
DI 12
TIME FILED 357P/9

CABLEGRAM

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

MARCH 9, 1942

11:05A.M.

From LONDON

To POTUS

SECRET

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 21 MARCH 9

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT PERSONAL
AND ~~SECRET~~ NO FOUR TWO PARA AM MOST DEEPLY GRATEFUL
FOR YOUR PROMPT AND GENEROUS RESPONSE TO MY SUGGESTIONS
STOP NEW POSITION IS BEING EXAMINED BY OUR STAFFS COMMA
AND I WILL CABLE YOU SHORTLY STOP

PRIME

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

AEL

CABLEGRAM

AC-4

45

AMDI 1

1040 AM TIME FILED

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

MARCH 10, 1942

5:46 A.M.

From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 22 MARCH TENTH

TO PRESIDENT [REDACTED] AND PERSONAL NO FOUR THREE PARA WE SHALL
GIVE STARK THE WARMEST WELCOME AND EVERY FACILITY FROM FORMER
NAVAL PERSON

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tol., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Answers Presidents'
#114, 9 Mar 42.

Action Copy

AMDI 13
filed 1026P/14
AE

CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

March 14, 1942 DDs - 5 to 14

5:59 P. M.

From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 24, March 14th.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1971

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ NUMBER
(Madagascar)
FORTY FOUR PARA WE HAVE DECIDED TO DO BONUS CMA AND AS IT IS QUITE
IMPOSSIBLE TO WEAKEN OUR EASTERN FLEET WE SHALL HAVE TO USE THE
WHOLE OF FORCE H NOW AT GIBRALTAR PD THIS WILL LEAVE THE WESTERN
EXIT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN UNCOVERED CMA WHICH IS MOST UNDESIRABLE PD
WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO SEND SAY TWO BATTLESHIPS CMA AN AIR-
CRAFT CARRIER CMA SOME CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS CMA FROM THE ATLANTIC
CMA TO TAKE THE PLACE OF FORCE H TEMPORARILY QUERY FORCE H WOULD HAVE
TO LEAVE GIBRALTAR NOT LATER THAN MARCH THIRTY AND COULD HARDLY
REACH GIBRALTAR AGAIN BEFORE THE END OF JUNE PD WE HAVE NOT PLANNED
ANY OPERATION FOR FORCE H INSIDE THE MEDITERRANEAN BETWEEN APRIL ONE
AND THE END OF JUNE PD IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT FRENCH RETALIATION CMA
IF ANY CMA FOR BONUS WOULD TAKE THE FORM OF ATTACKING UNITED STATES
SHIPS BY AIR PD MORAL EFFECT OF UNITED STATES SHIPS AT GIBRALTAR
WOULD CMA IN ITSELF CMA BE HIGHLY BENEFICIAL ON BOTH SIDES OF THE
STRAITS PD OPERATION BONUS CANNOT GO FORWARD UNLESS YOU ARE ABLE TO DO
THIS PD ON THE OTHER HAND CMA THERE ARE THE GREATEST DANGERS IN
LEAVING BONUS TO BECOME A JAPANESE BASE PD WE ARE NOT TELLING ANYONE / ABOUT
OUR PLANS AND ASSAULTING TROOPS MINGLE QUITE EASILY WITH OUR MARCH
CONVOY TO THE EAST PD A SEPARATE TELEGRAM WILL EXPLAIN THE MEANING OF
BONUS.

Action Copy

PRIME.

CABLEGRAM

AC -4

ACF

DI 1

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

15/1105 AM

MARCH 15 1942

627 A M.

From LONDON

To POTUS

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 25 MARCH FIFTEENTH

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT PERSONAL AND

SECRET

NUMBER FORTYFIVE PDFOR BONUS READ MADAGASCAR NOW

RENAMED IRONCLAD PD

PRIME

King

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

CABLEGRAM

AMDI 1
408P/17thReceived at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

March 17, 1942

11:58 A M.

From AMEMBASSY LONDON

To POTUS WASHINGTON

REGRADED-UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72

By R. H. Parks

Date MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

No XXXC 26 seventeenth

Former Naval Person to President personal and ~~secret~~ number 46.

1. I have been earnestly considering your's of March 10.

Although I sent a paraphrase of the operative parts of your proposals to Australia and New Zealand, I have not yet heard from them. It may be that Australia is relying on the discussions you will have with Dr. Evatt who should now be with you.

2. I have also had the proposals examined by our Chiefs of Staff. In principle we see great merits in the simplification resulting from the American control of the Pacific Sphere and the British control of the Indian Sphere, and indeed there is no other way. There are however certain issues, some fundamental, which I must place before you.

3. Nothing must prevent the United States and British Navies from working to a common strategy from Alaska to Capetown. The immense distances and practical facts require them to act in widely separated theaters, but they must operate with a single purpose, an exact timing, and upon closely coordinated plans.

4. We are building up and shall presently have a respectable force which will be based in the Central Indian Ocean. This force already consists of five (5) battleships, two (2) of our latest

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

From _____

To _____

~~SECRET~~
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

M.
MAY 5 1972

page 2 No XXXC 26 seventeenth

Copies furnished as noted:

aircraft carriers, four (4) modern cruisers and several older ones, and thirteen (13) destroyers; all under the command of Admiral Somerville who has done well in a great deal of fighting in the Mediterranean. The remnants of the Dutch Navy are reforming with our assistance and wish to work under our command. In one month the modern aircraft carrier illustrious, in two months the valiant and in six months, we hope, the Queen Elizabeth will reinforce our Eastern Fleet. On completion of the refits of Nelson, Rodney and King George Fifth, and should the situation permit, we should consider sending either Nelson or Rodney or possibly both to join the Eastern Fleet.

5. The British Eastern Fleet, composed as it is to a great extent of old ships with short range guns, could only deal with a certain number of the Japanese Fleet. Similarly, a general fleet engagement between the whole Japanese Fleet and the American Pacific Fleet would be a close run thing.

6. Therefore it seems to us that all our Naval Forces must be directed from a single standpoint, and their problems viewed as a whole. This can only be done by the machinery of the combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee, acting directly under you and me in constant contact and agreement. All other arrangements for separate

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

From _____

To _____

page 3 No XXXC 26 Seventeenth

M.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

Commands in the Pacific and India Spheres must be effectively subordinated to this supreme Command. I feel sure I am right in reading your proposals in this sense.

7. On this basis we welcome your proposal that an American should be appointed Commander in Chief of all Allies and of all three services in the Pacific Area, with local Commanders in Australia, New Zealand, etc.

8. We also agree that the American Chiefs of the Staff under your direction should decide day to day operational questions affecting the action of this American Commander in Chief in the Pacific Area.

9. We suggest however that Staff Officers from Australia, New Zealand, the Dutch and the Chinese should be available in Washington to serve the American Staffs on operational matters as may be necessary. These officers might also be the technical advisers of the members of the Pacific Council in Washington to which I refer in paragraph eleven (11) below. We have such an arrangement successfully working in London now.

10. So much for the executive conduct of the Pacific war. I now come to the advisory bodies which will have to be consulted on

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From

To

DECLASSIFIED
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

Page 4 No XXXC 26 seventeenth

MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

larger issues. Owing to geography they must be duplicated and have the same composition on each side of the Atlantic ocean. There will in fact be two Pacific Councils. The one in Washington, lying as it will in close touch with the American Executive machinery in the Pacific Area, will naturally have more practical and more effective influence upon events than its reproduction in London. It is not possible to draw a line between strategic and political matters, as these are interwoven at the top.

11. As we see it, our Pacific council in London would discuss the whole state of the war against Japan and we would send our opinions from time to time to the similar body in the United States. The executive conduct of the Pacific war against Japan would remain the integral responsibility of the United States acting through the American Chiefs of the Staff and the American Commander in Chief, subject always to the coordination of Naval effort as stated in paragraph three (3) and to the decisions on grand strategy which are the function of the combined Chiefs of the Staff and the Heads of Governments similarly the executive conduct of operations in the Indian Theatre would remain the integral responsibility of the British War Cabinet acting through the Commander in Chief Eastern Fleet and the British Chiefs of the Staff, but the Pacific Council

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~
M.

From _____

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

To _____

page 5

No XXXC 26 Seventeenth

MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

in Washington would send us their opinions when they thought fit.

12. It follows from the above that the United Kingdom should have a representative on the Pacific Council in Washington and that you should have a representative on the Pacific Council in London. Equally we would keep your Representative informed of the course of affairs in the Indian Ocean, which also forms a large part of the Sphere of the London Pacific Council. The Dutch, for instance, are full of ideas for counter attacks on the Japanese captured places, which we will do our best to further before the summer is far advanced.

13. Turning back again to the highest war direction, the present arrangement centres upon the combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee in Washington. The three British representatives in Washington act in accordance with the instructions of the British Chiefs of the Staff Committee in London. Do you wish that American representatives, say Admiral Stark and General Chaney, should sit in on Japanese matters from time to time with our three Chiefs of the Staff here.

14. I have now heard from New Zealand that they welcome your kindly offer to send an American Division at the dates mentioned into New Zealand. They have at no time asked for the

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

page 6

No XXC 26

By R. H. Parks
Seventeenth

Date

MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

withdrawal of their Division from the Middle East, and they do not ask now. At the same time they do not wish to engage themselves never to ask for such return. If, for instance, they were heavily invaded their menabroads would feel deep distress about their homes and families and desire to go home and defend them. However, I do not think they are going to be heavily invaded, and anyhow the matter would be governed by shipping. Therefore let us take it as settled that you send a United States Division to New Zealand and the New Zealand Division remains in the Middle East, at any rate for many months to come. You will probably know from Dr Evatt as soon as I from Mr Curtin what the Australian position is. It would certainly be most unfortunate if the last Australian Division left the Middle East on the eve of the German offensive against the Caucasus.

15. On the supreme and general outlook in the Pacific, we are both agreed on the paramount importance of regaining the initiative against Japan and taking all the captured places their hostages to fortune, as they were formerly ours. We assume that any large scale methods of achieving this would be capable of being discussed by the combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee in Washington and would not be settled out of hand by the American

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____

page 7

No YXC 26

Seventeenth

~~SECRET~~
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

Chiefs of the Staff and their American Commander in Chief. We should naturally consult similarly on large scale methods in our area.

16. There are a few points of detail. In your telegram of March ten you say "India would not be occupied by American troops or planes," but in your earlier message to me, No. 113, in which you set out American air dispositions overseas for 1942, you allocated sixty heavy bombers and eighty pursuit aircraft for the China-India-Burma area. We hope this proposal holds good.

17. Furthermore in detail, we would rather have the American light bombers and fighters which you think sending to England by July sent to the Middle East, where American aircraft of these types are already operating. We are very short of these types in the Middle East and cannot increase what we are sending from here. By sending American types direct you would save the double lift and thus shipping. We have had to bleed the Middle East so much in order to help India, Ceylon and Burma that I am very anxious about our air position in that area.

18. We have agreed on a line dividing the Pacific and Indian spheres, but naturally this line would be elastic, dependent on the movements of the enemy or tasks we might appoint for our forces.

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

From _____

To _____

page 8

No XXC 26

Seventeenth

~~SECRET~~
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

M. MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

We must not have anything so rigid as to hamper planning or manoeuvre. The First Sea Lord is anxious that I should put the following point to you. (Begins) As the Naval responsibility for dealing with sea-borne raids of the North West and West Coasts of Australia will be British, we assume that under your proposals, in which there are only two areas in the East, the boundary between them will generally follow the line of the Dutch Islands, modified as necessary to give room for your submarine patrols to the south of these islands (Ends). Perhaps this could be taken care of in the final drawing of the line.

19. I have not attempted to discuss in this telegram your proposals for the joint control of the north and south Atlantic area. Pound is making some suggestions to King for a co-ordination of effort in the event of a break out of German ships.

20. To sum up, I feel that your proposals as I have ventured to elaborate and interpret them will achieve the double purpose, namely (a) integrity of executive and operational action, and (b) opportunity of reasonable consultation for those whose fortunes are involved ends message.

Prime

Action Copy

AC-14

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

March 17, 1942

540P M

From London

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

T. Potus

~~MAY 5 1972~~

Copies furnished as noted:

NO 27 March seventeenth

NO 47

Your No one two one (121). We are delighted MaCarthur has arrived in Australia and that he has been appointed supreme commander with general acclamation.

You will by now have received my long reply to your No one one five (115) about the division of responsibility against Japan. I am cabling you tonight about Burma command. Former naval person.

Prime

Action Copy

AMDI 10
time filed 1152P/17
AE

Cablegram

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

March 17, 1942.

7:20 P. M.

From London

To The President of the United States

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 28, March 17th.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

Number forty eight (48).

By R. H. Parks

Date

MAY 5 1972

Former Naval Person to President personal and

~~SECRET~~

1. Your numbers one one nine (119) and one two zero (120). If Tirpitz comes out only the fastest heavy ships are of any use. We must therefore keep two (2) King George Fifths and Renown in north working with our only remaining fast aircraft carrier on this station. Tirpitz has gone north to strike at our joint munition convoys to Russia and action may easily arise. Texas class could not play any part in such fighting. They could not therefore release corresponding force to go to Gibraltar.

2. In view of your help we could send to Gibraltar one eight (8) inch cruiser and four (4) destroyers (British) from the home fleet and makeshift with that while force Hypo is away.

3. We should greatly welcome your sending to home fleet one or two heavy cruisers, not less than four (4) destroyers, and above all please a fast carrier invaluable to join Victorious in catching Tirpitz.

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

_____M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Page two of No. 28 from London.

4. We assume any ships you will send will be under operational orders of C in C, home fleet.

5. Your points about sinkings and Atlantic convoys are being gone into separately, and a further signal will be made from Pound to King.

Prime.

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

AMDI 11

AE

time filed 0123/18

Cablegram

Ac-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

March 17, 1942.

8:57P M.

From London

To The President of the United States

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 29, March 17th.

Former Naval Person to President personal and

~~Secret~~. No. 49.

MAY 5 1972

Your message of March 15 about Military Command in Burma and Southern China. We do not think that suggestion that General Stilwell should have a separate military command in Burma as well as in Southern China would work well. I cannot do better than send you the message just received by me from General Alexander.

"From Burma army number nine (9) March 15.

1. General Stilwell arrived here yesterday March 14 and stated that Generalissimo had issued orders stopping the movement of Fifth Army to Toungoo Area. This is serious in view ^{of} possible early advance of Japanese on this front and it is of urgent importance to transfer one BurDiv. to Prome Area as agreed with China. Seventeenth Div alone in present state will have difficulty in holding up enemy advance on oilfields. Stilwell has wired Generalissimo on this subject and meanwhile is giving orders for certain moves to proceed. Dennys (since killed) has also gone to

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

Page two of No. 29 from London.

Chungking to clarify situation.

2. Stilwell also states Generalissimo has placed him in Independent Command of Chinese troops in Burma which until March fourteen were under me. Have had no other notification. This arrangement appears very unsatisfactory as Stilwell has not necessary staff or local knowledge to take command and his other duties must inevitably interfere. We have built up supply organization for China who have no supply units and also complete liaison organization down to divisions which Stilwell cannot replace."

Would it not be better for Stilwell to be under general directions of Alexander in respect of troops moving actually in British territory where we are responsible for supply and will have constantly increasing forces? Alexander is one of our best Officers and cut his way out of the Rangoon Area with great determination.

Prime.

Action Copy

BVC

CABLE

AC-4

ALDI 12

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FILED 0345

March 17, 1942

~~SECRET~~

1113P M.

From LONDON

To POTUS

Copies furnished as noted:

XXXC NO. 30 17th

From former Naval person to President number fifty personal and ~~secret~~. Pound has just informed me that he has received a very nice message from King in which the latter says he will do all he can to keep the Japanese interested in the Pacific, whilst we are building up our strength in the Indian Ocean.

Two King also mentions that he was considering sending your two new battleships to the Pacific when my request to you to put a force at Gibraltar was received. We had no idea that your new ships were ready for service, and therefore only had in mind two of your Texas class.

Three. We greatly appreciate your willingness to send your new ships to us but, knowing how urgent it is that you build up your Pacific fleet, I think we should be wrong to accept your generous offer, thereby postponing this great reinforcement to your fleet. If you can send us the ships I mentioned in my number forty eight (48) we can manage and will be most grateful.

Prime

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

DI 11
555P/March 18
CE

Cablegram

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

March 18

1.18P M.

From London

To Potus

Copies furnished as noted:

XXXC 31 March 18

Former Naval Person to President personal and

~~SECRET~~ no five one (51) your no one two two (122).

I am delighted to receive this splendid news. We have not been able to form any impression here of such events, except from the vague accounts in the newspapers, in which one cannot see the wood for the trees. It would be a great help if we could be told more. Could not some channel be arranged. Once more all my thanks and congratulations.

Prime

~~SECRET~~
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

EH

CABLEGRAM

AMDI 6

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

5P/19th time filed

March 19, 1942

12:16 P. M.

From AMEMBASSY LONDON

To POTUS WASHINGTON

Copies furnished as noted:

NO XXXC 32 nineteenth

Former Naval Person to President personal and ~~number~~ number
fifty two.

We are deeply grateful for your sending a force in which is
included one of your new battleships to join CINC Home Fleet.

This will enable us to send a force which will include the
Renown to Gibraltar. We will get in touch with Ghormley where
your ships should proceed.

When the time is approaching for your new battleships to
go to the Pacific please give us sufficient warning to enable
readjustments to be made in British dispositions

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

MD
AMDI 2
1223P/20

CABLEGRAM

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

March 20, 1942

7:45 A.M.

From Amembassy London REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
To Potus By R. H. Parks Date _____

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 34 March 20

Former Naval person to President personal and
secret no five three (53).

Your no one two four (124). We cordially accept
the arrangement you propose and instructions have been
sent to Generals Wavel and Alexander accordingly.

Your one two five (125). The highest importance
is attached by us to bombing U-Boat construction yards
and bases and they will play a leading part in our
spring bombing offensive. All is in readiness for
this, including a vastly improved method of finding
our way to the target, first tried at Essen a fortnight
ago. We have been only held back by weather, which is
the worst experiences for bombing purposes in fifteen
years, just as last year was the best. It would be
improvident to lose fifteen (15) or twenty (20) bom-
bers, as we have sometimes done, returning to Fogbound
Airfields in this Island, when better conditions are
certainly approaching. No chance will be lost.

We are also studying the attack by long Range
Aircraft upon U-Boats coming from Bordeaux to the
Caribbean. It is a question of competing claims. Prime

Action Copy

Note: Par. 1 of 53 was given to Gen. Marshall and Par 2 was given to Admiral King.

No. 54 - Copies were given to Admiral King, Gen. Marshall and Gen Arnold.

DI9
time filed 643P/20
AE

Cablegram

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

March 20, 1942.

2:03 P. M.

From LONDON

To The President of the United States

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 35, March 20th, 1942.

TO THE PRESIDENT. ~~SECRET~~

No. 54.

Prime Minister of New Zealand has today telegraphed that he is in entire accord with your proposals for unified control in the Pacific, Indian Ocean and Atlantic, and that the New Zealand Government are prepared to accept the scheme in principle and do their utmost to ensure its efficient operation. Fraser adds that there are some matters of detail on which his Government are not quite clear and which they may wish to take up later. In particular he expresses the hope that the close collaboration between Australia and New Zealand, which has recently been agreed between the Governments concerned, will not be weakened.

Fraser also says that New Zealand Government warmly welcomes the appointment of General MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the Pacific area.

Former Naval Person.

Prime.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

Action Copy

MAY - 5 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have asked the War Department to prepare any comment they wish on the part of the second paragraph which begins with the words "It would suit us better" and ends with "could be managed."

H.L.H.

het
Time Filed 21/835P
AMDI 5

Cablegram

ac-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

March 21, 1942

411P

M.

From London

To Potus Washington

Copies furnished as noted:

No 36 March twenty first

To President from former naval person No 55

Have now had very careful consideration given to your most secret telegram No one one three (113) by my close military advisers.

Your generous offer to lend us American shipping and, in addition, to release the "Queen Mary", "Queen Elizabeth", and "Aquitania" for our use is most welcome and I gladly accept the conditions set out in your para five. Thanks to your help we should now be able to send one more infantry division and one armored division to the East making five in all in the next three months. We would have preferred to keep the monster liners, particularly "Queen Elizabeth," on the long and safer journeys, but the need is so pressing that we must, I think, accept the risks of the Atlantic for them. There is a small point in your para five (C). It would suit us better if you could send a further nine thousand American troops to Iceland (C), even at the expense of Northern Ireland. Perhaps you would consider whether this could be managed.

Personnel shipping. I am delighted to learn that your man lift is so much better than I had been advised. We

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From

To

Copies furnished as noted:

No 36 from London Page two
shall need it all.

Air. I am immensely impressed by your layout which should dominate the future and by the bold strategic outlook on which it is based. I am however, as you know, very anxious about the Levant-Caspian front. Even with United States contributions of air craft for the RAF we ourselves can do little for that theatre. I therefore ventured to ask in Par seventeen (17) of my number forty six (46) whether you would consider sending to the middle east instead of to the United Kingdom, all the light bombers and as many as possible of the fighters listed in your para eight G (one).

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

AEL

CABLEGRAM

AC-4

AMDI 9
336 P TIME FILED

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY

March 23, 1942

10:56 A M.

From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
THE WHITE HOUSE

Copies furnished as noted:

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

By R. H. Parks

Date

MAY 5 1972

No. 37 March 23rd

Former Naval person to President personal
and ~~REDACTED~~ No. fifty six (56).

1. Your No. one two seven apostrophe five
(127'5). You have no doubt seen the correspondence
between me and Curtin Curtin, which speaks for itself.
I accepted his agreement and waited five (5) days
before making the announcement.

2. The matter is complicated by Australian
Party politics which proceed with much bitterness
and jealousy regardless of national danger. The
present Labour Government in Australia, with a majority
of one, contains various personalities, particularly
Evatt and Beasley, who have made their way in local
politics by showing hostility to Great Britain. The
failure of sea power to protect Australia from Japan
brings this sentiment to a head. I am very glad you
encouraged Casey to take up the appointment.

3. I shall be interested to know your personal
impressions of Evatt and how you get on with him.

Action Copy

Prime.

dj

CABLEGRAM

AC-4

AMDI 1

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

24/1022a

March 24, 1942

541A M.

From LONDON

To POTUS

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 38 XXXC March 24th.

Former Naval person to President. No. 57. My
No. 46.

1. I have now received telegram from Australian Government commenting on proposals contained in yours of March 10. The text is contained in my immediately following telegram. I have already sent you comments of His Majestys Government in my No. 46 and of the New Zealand Government in my No. 54.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY -5-1972

Action Copy

DI 2

AE

filed March 24, NPT

Cablegram

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

March 24, 1942.

10:43 A. M.

From London

To The President of the United States

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 39, March 24th.

Former Naval Person to President. No. five eight (58).

Following is text referred to in my five seven (57). Begins.

We have been considering the President's proposals in the light of your cablegram and several cablegrams from Sir Earle Page and a communication received by me from the President stating that he is in general agreement with our proposals regarding organization and commanding of the Australian area except as to some details concerning relationship to the combined Chiefs of Staff and as to boundaries. Prime Minister in view of the various observations which have been expressed on the composition of the higher machinery its functions location and the procedure to be followed we consider it necessary to summarize our understanding of the position as follows together with any necessary comments.

(1) Division of World War Theatre. This is to be divided into the following three areas - (a) The Atlantic under joint British and American responsibility. (b) The Indian Middle East and Mediterranean areas under British responsibility. (c) The Pacific including China under United States operational responsibility.

The question of the relationship between operational

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tol., 3-29-78
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

Page two of No. 39 from London.

responsibility in the Pacific Area to the inter governmental body is referred to later.

As already stated the President in his message to me considers some detailed adjustments are necessary in boundaries. The significance of the First Sea Lords point on paragraph one two of Dominions Office cablegram three one nine (319) relative to the boundary between the Indian and Pacific areas as it affects the North West and Western Coasts of Australia is not clear in view of advice from Page that the Pacific War Council agreed to our suggestion that the proposed line of division should not run to latitude five (5) degrees south to Onslow as proposed but on reaching Longitude one one zero (110) degrees East should run due south along that meridian.

Subject to the foregoing we agree in principle with the President's proposals for the division of the World Theatre into the three areas mentioned.

The Australian Chiefs of Staff consider that on tactical and strategical grounds China should be within the middle area rather than the Pacific because the only lines of communication with China that are or are likely to be open are through the middle area and the bases for aircraft operations in China must be sited within the

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ M.

From _____

To _____

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

Page three of No. 39 from London.

Indian Command. Also attacks against the Japs in or from China must form part of combined operations on the part of the forces located in the middle area.

(2) Pacific War Council London. It is noted that you suggest that the President should have a representative on the Pacific Council in London and we fully agree with this proposal.

The functions of the Pacific Council in London are described in cablegram No. three one nine (319) as discussion of the whole state of the war against Japan and the communication of its opinions from time to time to the similar body in the United States. This appears satisfactory subject to the later observations on the Pacific Council in Washington.

(3) Pacific War Council Washington. The summary of the President's telegram refers to the setting up in Washington of an advisory body on operational matters consisting of members of Australia, New Zealand, Netherlands East Indies and China under the Chairmanship of an American. We have from the first made it clear that it is imperative that the Commonwealth Government should have a voice in the higher direction of the war in the Pacific Theatre particularly as the whole of our forces are being placed under the operational control of the Supreme Commander.

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

By R. H. Parks

Date MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

Page four of No. 39 from London.

On twenty first January (1-21st) we asked that the Pacific War Council be established at Washington comprising representatives of the governments of the United Kingdom, USA, Australia, China, Netherlands and New Zealand and proposed that this body should be a council of action for the higher direction of the war in the Pacific. In our proposals of 4th March we stated that the Council should be responsible for the higher policy of the war in the Anzac area and should deal with questions of policy and the provision of forces and supplies. It is observed in paragraph ten of Dominions office cablegram No. three one nine (319) that reference is made to quote the advisory bodies which will have to be consulted on larger issues unquote. We would not be content with an advisory body on operational matters in Washington.

(4) Machinery for strategical and operational control. The Chiefs of Staff committee is the technical advisory body to the Pacific War Council in London and liaison exists between it and the Australian service advisers in London.

We are in agreement with the President's proposal that the United States should assume operational responsibility for the Pacific Area. As suggested in our proposals of 4th March we desire to establish in Washington a Staff comprising a Naval and Army and an

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-22-72

Copies furnished as noted:

Page five of No. 39 from London.

By R. H. Parks

Date MAY 5 1972

Air Force Officer who would act as the technical advisers to the Australian Government Representative on the Pacific War Council and who for the purpose of Anzac strategy should be associated with the American Chiefs of Staff as the joint body for advice to the Pacific War Council on the larger issue.

Agreement has already been reached on the appointment of the Supreme Commander in the Anzac area. The directive suggested by us is complete to the higher machinery and the appointment of the Supreme Commander. The Australian Chiefs of Staff consider that the Supreme Commander should be located in Australia because he must be in close touch with the bulk of the forces under his orders especially with those in the forward area in order to judge the capacity and effectiveness of these forces who are undertaking both offensive and defensive operations.

Instead of the local command in Australia and in New Zealand being under an Australian and New Zealander respectively as proposal of 4th March should be adopted and an Army and an Air Commander appointed for each of the following.

- (a) Australia its territories and New Caledonia.
- (b) New Zealand, Fiji, and all the Island for which New Zealand is responsible.

General Brett of the United States Army has already been

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

M.

From

To

Copies furnished as noted:

Page six of No. 39 from London.

appointed to Command the Allied Air Forces in Australia. In regard to the grand strategy relating to operations in the three areas it is understood that advice on this would be the responsibility of the combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington and in London.

(5) It is understood that the joint committees on shipping and raw materials and on munitions will continue to function on their present basis. Curtin.

Prime.

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

net

Time Filed 27/632P

AMDI 7

Radiogram

ac-44

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

March 27, 1942

153P M.

From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

Copies furnished as noted:

No 40 March twenty seventh

Former naval person to President personal and ~~no 59~~
no 59 and your 126.

I asked the foreign office to send you a note on the details of your project which I hope may be considered. We do not mind your sending very limited quantities of supplies to French North Africa provided the American observers can penetrate the country freely especially if you could get compensating advantages in securing the control of strategic materials now going to Germany. We value your contacts with Vichy and it is well worth paying a certain price but please. (apparently an omission here)

Nothing must interfere with operation iron-clad to which we are now committed and no assurances offered by the French about defending their empire like they did Indo-China should be accepted by the United States in such a way as to enable them to complain of a breach of faith.

Our operation has been carefully planned. It comprises two strong and well-trained brigades with

Action Copy

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

March twenty seventh page two
a third in case of a check together with tank land-
ing craft and two carriers as well as a battleship
and cruisers. All these are additional to our
Eastern fleet which is now growing in size and
balance. It would be a great help if we could
give the impression by dropping leaflets at the
moment of attack that the expedition was Anglo-
American. Please consider whether you can let us
do this or anything like it.

Prime

~~SECRET~~

Action Copy

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 31, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL MARSHALL
ADMIRAL KING
LIEUTENANT GENERAL ARNOLD

Attached hereto is a copy of a recent despatch received by the President from the Prime Minister. The President requests that the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepare a draft of reply.

Very respectfully,

JOHN L. MCCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

No. 60

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 5 1972

CDDI 1

CABLEGRAM

AC-4

29/540P

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

dj

March 29, 1942

601P M.

From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Copies furnished as noted:

XXXC 41 March 29th.

Former Naval Person to President personal and ~~secret~~
No. sixty.

1. In order to cope with future U-Boat hatchings, we are emphasising bombing attacks on U-Boat nests, and last night went to Lubeck with two five zero bombers including forty three heavy. Results are said to be the best ever. This is in accordance with your wishes expressed in your No. one two five.

2. As I mentioned in my No. fifty three replying to your No. one two five, Admiralty and Coastal Command, RAF have evolved a plan for a day and night patrol over the Debouches from the Bay of Biscay. Biscay ports are the shortest and best departure points for U-Boats operating in Carribean and American coasts. German present practice is to proceed submerged by day and make speed on the surface at night. We hope that night attacks and menace by aircraft will hamper their night passage and force increasing exposure by day. Essential therefore to menace both by day and night thus increasing length of voyage and diminishing operational spell on your side.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

By R. H. Parks

Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

M.

From

To

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

Page 2. XXXC 41 from London 3/29

This advantage would be additional to any kiplings or maimings, some of which might be hoped for each month since there are never less than six U-Boats going or coming through the area to be patrolled.

3. In view of the very heavy sinkings still occurring on your side to which convoy when organized can only be partial remedy, Admiralty are pressing to allocate four and later on six bomber squadrons to this new Biscay patrol. On merits I am most anxious to meet their wish.

4. On the other hand the need to bomb Germany is great. Our new method of finding targets is yielding most remarkable results. However our bombing force has not expanded as we hoped. We have had a heavy disappointment in a structural defect with the wing tips of the Lancasters which requires laying up four squadrons of our latest and best for several months. Just at the time when the weather is improving, when Germans are drawing away flak from their cities for their offensive against Russia, when you are keen about our bombing U-Boat nests, when the oil targets are especially attractive, I find

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From

To

Copies furnished as noted:

Page 3. XXXC 41 from London 3/29

it very hard to take away these extra six squadrons from bomber command in which Harris is doing so well.

5. Arnold had arranged at your orders to send the first installment of United States Bomber Groups to England arriving in July. Can you not manage to expedite TMMS? Never was there so much good work to be done and so few to do it. We must not let our summer air attack on Germany decline into a second rate affair. Everything is ready for your people here and there are targets of all kinds, from easy to hard, to work up on in contact with the enemy. Even a hundred American heavy bombers working from this country before the end of May would lift our air offensive to the proper scale and enable me to spare the six squadrons now for the Biscay patrols.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

March 31, 1942

9:20 P. M.

From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 42, March 31st.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

Former Naval Person to President Personal and

MAY 5 1972

~~Secret~~. No. sixty one.

Para 1. Air attack on Malta is very heavy. There are now in Sicily about four hundred German and two hundred Italian fighters and bombers. Malta can only now muster twenty or thirty serviceable fighters. We keep feeding Malta with Spitfires in packets of sixteen loosed from Eagle carrier from about six hundred miles west of Malta.

This has worked a good many times quite well but Eagle is now laid up for a month by defects in her steering gear. There are no Spitfires in Egypt. Argus is too small and too slow and moreover she has to provide the fighter cover for the Carrier launching the Spitfires and for the escorting force. We would use Victorious but unfortunately her lifts are too small for Spitfires. Therefore there will be a whole month without any Spitfires reinforcements.

Para 2. It seems likely from extraordinary enemy concentration on Malta that they hope to exterminate our Air Defense in time to reinforce either Libya or their

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

To _____

By R. H. Parks

Date

MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

Page two of No. 42 from London 3/31.

Russian offensive. This would mean that Malta would be at the best powerless to interfere with reinforcements of armour to Rommel, and our chances of resuming offensive against him at an early date ruined.

Para 3. Would you be willing to allow your Carrier Wasp to do one of these trips provided details are satisfactorily agreed between the Naval Staffs. With her broad lifts, capacity and length, we estimate that Wasp could take fifty or more Spitfires. Unless it were necessary for her to fuel Wasp could proceed through the straits at night without calling at Gibraltar until on the return journey as the Spitfires would be embarked in the Clyde.

Para 4. Thus instead of not being able to give Malta any further Spitfires during April a powerful Spitfire force could be flown into Malta at a stroke and give us a chance of inflicting a very severe and possibly decisive check on enemy. Operation might take place during third week of April.

Prime.

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Captain McCrea called to say that the Chiefs of Staff sent to the President a memorandum from the P.M., dated March 24th, having to do with the delineation of the theatres of war. Have you seen it?

G.

This no longer holds -

Cablegram

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~
April 1, 1942

8:32 P. M.

From London

To The President of the United States
The White House.

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 43, April 1st, 1942.

~~REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British~~
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

To President from Former Naval person personal and
~~SECRET~~

No. sixty two.

Delighted by your letter of March eighteen just received. I am so grateful for all your thoughts about my affairs, and personal kindness. Our position here has always been quite solid but naturally with nothing but disaster to show for ones work people were restive in Parliament and the Press. I find it very difficult to get over Singapore but I hope we shall redeem it ere long.

Dickies show at St Nazaire, though small in scale, was very bracing. For your personal and Secret eye. I made him Vice Admiral, Lieutenant General and Air Marshal some few weeks ago, and have put him on the Chiefs of Staff Committee as Chief of Combined Operations. He is an equal member attending whenever either his own affairs or the General Conduct of the war are under consideration. He will be in the centre of what you mention on the second page of your letter, Paragraph three. I am looking forward to receiving your plan. We are working very hard here, not only at plans but at preparations.

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

Page two of No. 43 from London, 4/1.

Your last paragraph on page one. Speaking as one amateur to another, my feeling is that the wisest stroke for Japan would be to press on through Burma northwards into China and try to make a job of that. They may disturb India, but I doubt its serious invasion. We are sending forty to fifty thousand men each month to the East. As they round the Cape we can divert them to Suez, Basra, Bombay, Ceylon or Australia. I have told Curtin that if he is seriously invaded, by which I mean six or eight enemy divisions, we will come to his aid. But of course this could only be at the expense of the most urgent needs in the other Theatres. I hope you will continue to give Australia all possible reinforcement and thus enable me to defend Egypt, the Levant and India successfully. It will be a ^{hard} task.

We cannot send any more submarines from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and dispose only of two British and four Dutch. We are much stronger now at Ceylon and are fairly equipped with Garrisons, Hurricanes, some Torpedo planes and RDF, together with pretty stiff flak. Admiral Somervilles fleet is growing to respectable

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. PARKS Date MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

Page three of No. 43 from London, 4/1.

proportions, and it may be an opportunity of fighting an action will occur. Meanwhile operation Ironclad is going ahead. This also concerns Dickie a good deal. Altogether I hope we shall be better off in the Indian Ocean in a little while, and that the Japanese will have missed their opportunity there.

It seems important to make the Japanese anxious for their numerous conquests and prevent them scraping together troops for further large excursions. I should be very glad to know how your plans for Californian Commandos are progressing. I see some hints that Donovan is working at them.

All now depends upon the vast Russo German struggle. It looks as if the heavy German offensive may not break until after the middle of May or even the beginning of June. We are doing all we can to help and also to take the weight off. We shall have to fight every convoy through to Murmansk. Stalin is pleased with our deliveries. They are due to go up fifty percent after June and it will be very difficult to do this in view of the new war and also of shipping. Only the weather is holding us back from

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

From _____

To _____

_____ M.
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

Page four of No. 43 from London, 4/1.

continuous heavy bombing attack on Germany. Our new methods are most successful. Essen, Cologne and above all Lubeck were all on the Coventry Scale. I am sure it is most important to keep this up all through the summer, blasting Hitler from behind while he is grappling with the Bear. Everything that you can send to weight our attack will be of the utmost value. At Malta also we are containing, with much hard fighting nearly six hundred German and Italian planes. I am wondering whether these will move to the South Russian front in the near future. There are many rumors of an air borne attack on Malta, possibly this month.

Having heard from Stalin that he was expecting the Germans would use gas on him, I have assured him that we shall treat any such outrage as if directed upon us, and will retaliate without limit. This we are in a good position to do. I propose at his desire to announce this towards the end of the present month and we are using the interval to work up our own precautions. Please let all the above be absolutely between ourselves.

Averell is a great help here. He had a remarkable

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Page five of No. 43 from London, 4/1.

success with the House of Commons Committee three hundred strong in a most powerful, convincing speech. We shall be very glad to have Wihant back, everybody is inspired by him. I am personally extremely well, though I have felt the weight of the War rather more since I got back than before.

My wife and I both send our kindest regards to you and Mrs. Roosevelt. Perhaps when the weather gets better I may propose myself for a weekend with you and flip over. We have so much to settle that would go easily in talk.

Prime.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

D16
filed 440p/2
ETT

Cablegram

CSWD

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY

April 2, 1942

11:49 A.M.

*✓ 1/1
McLean*
From London

To The President of The United States
The White House

Copies furnished as noted:

No. XXXC 44 April 2nd, 1942

To President personal and ~~secret~~ no. 63. Your
no. 129. Delighted Harry and Marshall are coming.
Looking forward to their arrival and the sooner the
better. Considering that everything turns on avail-
ability of naval forces and shipping we should
greatly welcome King coming too. From former naval
person.

Prime

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

RCB
AMDI 3
Filed 4th 135P

Cablegram

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 4, 1942

8:50 AM M.

From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

Copies furnished as noted:

No. XXXC 45 April 4th

Former Naval Person to President No. 64.

Your 131. Fully agree.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

URGENT

~~SECRET~~

md
AXDI 9
filed 618p/7

Cablegram

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 7, 1942

12:35 P.M.

SECRET

From London

To The President of United States

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 46 Seventh

Former Naval person to President personal and
~~number~~ number 65.

According to our information 5 and possibly 6 Japanese Battleships, probably including 2 of 16 inch Guns, and certainly 5 Aircraft Carriers, are operating in the Indian Ocean. We cannot of course make head against this Force, especially if it is concentrated. You know the composition of our Fleet. The 4 Roger class Battleships were good enough, in combination with the others, to meet the 3 Kongos, which was all we believed were over on our side. They cannot of course cope with modernized Japanese Ships. Even after the heavy losses inflicted on the enemys Aircraft in their abortive attack on Colombo, we cannot feel sure that our 2 Carriers would beat the 4 Japanese Carriers concentrated South of Ceylon. The situation is therefore one of grave anxiety.

It is not yet certain whether the enemy is making a mere demonstration in the Indian Ocean or whether these movements are the prelude to an invasion in force of Ceylon. In existing circumstances our Naval Forces are not strong enough to oppose this.

As you must now be decidedly superior to the enemy Forces in the Pacific, the situation would seem to offer an immediate opportunity to the United States Pacific Fleet which might be of such a nature as to compel Japanese Naval Forces in the Indian Ocean to return to the Pacific, thus relinquishing or leaving unsupported any invasion enterprise which they have in mind or to which they are committed. I cannot too urgently impress the importance of this upon you.

Looking forward to receiving Harry.

Action Copy

Prime
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-7
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 5 1972

April 8, 1942.

PRESIDENT TO MR. HOPKINS PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~

THE SITUATION SET FORTH IN YOUR HOSTS NUMBER 65 IS BEING MET BY
EXPEDITING MOVEMENTS. ALREADY IN HAND WHICH SHOULD TEND TO GIVE SOME
RELIEF FROM CURRENT PRESSURE IN CRITICAL AREA OF ENEMY NAVAL CONCEN-
TRATION

ROOSEVELT

4-8-42

original given to him Tully

F. L. M. - Am

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 1 1972

~~SECRET~~

April 8, 1942.

~~No 132~~
MR HOPKINS

PRESIDENT TO PRIME-MINISTER PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~

YOUR HOSTS
THE SITUATION SET FORTH IN ~~YOUR~~ NUMBER 65 IS BEING MET BY EXPEDITING MOVEMENTS

ALREADY IN HAND WHICH SHOULD TEND TO GIVE SOME RELIEF FROM CURRENT PRESSURE IN
CRITICAL
EXISTING AREA OF ENEMY NAVAL CONCENTRATION

For Bureau

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 1 1972

het
Time Filed 8/0301
AMDI 13

Cablegram

ac-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 7, 1942

PRIORITY

927P M.

From London

To President of the United States
The White House

Copies furnished as noted:

No 47 April 7, 1942

Former naval person to President No 66 8th.

Since I sent you my number 65 of 7th I have received the following from Deputy Cinc at Colombo. Begins: Captain of Gandara and survivors of Gandara and Dardamus (2 merchant ships sunk in Bay of Bengal) report ships were sunk by 2 heavy and 1 light cruiser, modern type. Previously reported as 2 battleships and 1 cruiser. Position 16 degrees North 82 degrees 20 minutes east at 0220 Z on the 6th. Further particulars to confirm identity are being sought.

Position therefore seems somewhat easier. Will keep you informed of every change. Both Dorsetshire and Cornwall, 10,000 ton 8 inch cruisers were sunk same day south of Ceylon by from 40 to 60 dive bombers each armed with 1 large bomb. There are 1100 survivors.

Hoping to see Harry and Marshall today.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

Boyle

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Modicum party started on second stage of journey at 5:00 A.M. today after a delay of forty-eight hours due to engine trouble and weather conditions. Should reach ultimate destination early tomorrow morning.

John B. Deane
J.R. DEANE,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- MAR 1 1972

Signature- ~~MAK~~ *MAK*



Pres

file
Boy

MEV

PLAIN

London

Dated April 8, 1942

Rec'd 9:12 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1690, eighth.

Mr. Hopkins, General Marshall and party arrived in London this afternoon. They are holding a joint press conference at seven-fifteen London time tonight.

MATTHEWS

NPL

Pres
bot
DM
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (MC)

London

Dated April 9, 1942

Rec'd 5:52 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH

1712, April 9, noon.

[REDACTED] AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM
MR. HOPKINS.

"Marshall and I saw the Prime Minister yes-
terday morning for two hours at Downing Street.
Marshall laid out fully the purpose of our visit.
The Prime Minister's response was good and I would
say indicates that the proposal will be explored
here sympathetically and I believe successfully.
We dined last night with Churchill, Attlee, General
Brooke and Eden. Some further progress was made.
Marshall meeting chiefs of staff all day today.
Churchill has just sent for me to discuss India
and I will wire or telephone you immediately
after I have talked with him. All well. Harry."

MATTHEWS

RDS

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date **MAR 1 1972**

D 16
filed 2:47am/11
ett

Cablegram

CSWD

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 10, 1942

9:28 P.M.

From London

To The President of The United States
The White House

Copies furnished as noted:

No. XXXC 48, April 11, 1942

No 67

To President Personal and

Have just received following from Cripps: I have tonight received long letter from Congress President stating that Congress is unable to accept proposals. Rejection on widest grounds and not solely on defense issue although it indicates that while Congress would agree that Commander-in-Chief should have freedom to control conduct of the war and connected activities as Commander-in-Chief and war member proposed formula left functions of defense member unduly restricted. Main ground of rejection is however that in the view of Congress there should be immediately a National Government and that without Constitutional changes there should be "definite assurances in conventions which would indicate that new government would function as a Free Government and members of which would act as members of a cabinet in a Constitutional Government". Letter also states that picture of proposed immediate arrangements is not essentially different from old ones "the whole object which we have in view that is

DECLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

No. XXXC 48, April 11, 1942

Page 2

to create a new psychological approach to the people to make them feel that their own national freedom had come, that they were defending their new won freedom, would be completely frustrated when they saw this old picture again which is such that Congress cannot fit into it."

There is clearly no hope of agreement and I shall start home on Sunday.

He is broadcasting at 2030 I. S. T today Saturday. I feel absolutely satisfied we have done our utmost and have sent Cripps the following telegram:

You have done everything in human power and your tenacity, perseverance and resourcefulness have proved how great was the British desire to reach a settlement. You must not feel unduly discouraged or disappointed by the results. The effect throughout Britain and in The United States has been wholly beneficial. The fact that the break comes on the broadest issues and not on tangled formulas about defense is a great advantage. I am very glad you are coming home at once, where a

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From

To

Copies furnished as noted:

No. XXXC 48, April 11, 1942

Page 3

most cordial welcome awaits you. Even though your hopes have not been fulfilled, you have rendered a very important service to the common cause and the foundations have been laid for the future progress of the peoples of India. From former Naval Person
no. 67.

Prime

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

Action Copy

AEL
AMDI 4
filed 143P/11th

CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

URGENT

April 11, 1942

7:55 A. M.

From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 49 April 11, 1942

From Mr. Harry Hopkins to the President most immediate and [REDACTED]. Had very satisfactory discussion last night between former Naval person, Pound, Brooke, Portal, Marshall and myself. Feel sure that our main business here is going to turn out satisfactorily. Former Naval person asking Marshall and me to meet with Cabinet Monday with Defense Ministers and Chiefs of Staff Tuesday night at which time I believe the matter will be decided definitely and after which former Naval person will undoubtedly get in direct touch with you. We are meeting Leathers this noon to discuss shipping and all its implications. Further military conferences tonight. Everybody here greatly disappointed at turn of events in India, but all believe that a fair offer was made and that no stone was left unturned to reach agreement. Quite apparent that further negotiations by Cripps would be futile.

Action Copy

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 5 1971

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

_____M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Page 2 No. 49 from London

Will you have someone telephone Diana and
tell her that Marshall has got me under control.
All here send you their warm regards. Am not
allowed to discuss weather, but my heavy under-
wear itches like the devil.

PRIME

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date _____

MAY 5 1972

~~SECRET~~

Action Copy

DI 3
filed 350/12
JMW

CABLEGRAM

CSWD

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 12, 1942

10:17 A. M.

From LONDON

~~SECRET~~

To POTUS

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 50, April 12th, 1942.

Former Naval Person to President personal
and secret No 68.

I have read with earnest attention your masterly document about future of the war and the great operations proposed. I am in entire agreement in principle with all you propose, and so are the Chiefs of Staff. We must of course meet day to day emergencies in the east and far east while preparing for the main stroke. All the details are being rapidly examined and preparations where action is clear have already begun. The whole matter will be discussed on evening of Tuesday, the 14th, by Defense Committee, to which Harry and Marshall are coming, and I have no doubt that I shall be able to send you our complete agreement.

I may say that I thought the proposals made for an interim operation in certain contingencies this year met the difficulties and uncertainties in an absolutely sound manner. If, as our experts believe, we

*Declassified
Published in Foreign Relations
of the U.S., 1942, Vol. 1, General
British Commonwealth, The
Far East.*

~~SECRET~~

Action Copy

RECEIVED-PAGE AMERICAN SALES BOOK CO., INC., NEW YORK, N.Y.

4-27-60

Paul L. Spicer

On exhibit in White House Dining Room - Orig. pulled for VWN 8/12/91

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Page 2 No. 50 from London, April 12, 1942

can carry this whole plan through successfully, it will be one of the grand events in all the history of war.

About 3 AM this morning, the 12th, when contrary to your instructions Harry and I were still talking, the text of your message to me about India came through from London. I could not decide such a matter without convening the Cabinet, which was not physically possible till Monday. Meanwhile Cripps had already left and all the explanations have been published by both sides. In these circumstances, Harry undertook to telephone to you explaining the position, but owing to atmospheric conditions he could not get through. He is going to telephone you this afternoon and also cable you a report.

You know the weight which I attach to everything you say to me, but I did not feel I could take responsibility for the defence of India if everything has again to be thrown into the melting pot at this critical

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Page 3 No. 50 from London, April 12, 1942
juncture. That I am sure would be the view of
Cabinet and of Parliament. As your telegram was
addressed to former Naval Person I am keeping it
as purely private, and I do not propose to bring it
before the Cabinet officially unless you tell me
you wish this done. Anything like a serious dif-
ference between you and me would break my heart and
surely deeply injure both our countries at the height
of this terrible struggle.

Prime

**REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~

Action Copy

PD

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London

Dated April 14, 1942

Rec'd 7:18 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1823, April 14, 1 p.m.

[REDACTED] AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM
HOPKINS.

Have you any news from Stalin and is there anything you want to say to me if and in case reports are true that Laval is back in power?

MATTHEWS

KLP

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By E. J. Stewart Date MAR 2 1972

RE
14/858PM
ANDI 9

CABLEGRAM

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 14, 1942

339 P M.

From Amembassy London

To POTUS Washn.

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 51. April 14th, 1942

Telegram from Mr Harry Hopkins to the President.

Shipping losses in Western North Atlantic during period January 12th to April 12th of United Nations tonnage are 1, 200,000 gross tons. Of this more than half are tankers. During the past week we have lost in the same area 150,000 tons, of which 106 000 tons were tankers. It seems to me that the ships we are losing are in the main far more important than the cargoes. We are going to need all of these ships desperately in the next few months.

British are agreeable to reducing stocks to make sure that ships are not sunk, and it seems to me that we should be able to do the same thing. In other words, unless the cargoes are absolutely essential the ships should not be permitted to sail until our new scheme comes into operation next month. I doubt very much that anything short of convoy is going to do this job, and risking further ships without reasonably sure protection is the wrong policy. I should feel somewhat differently about this if every cargo was absolutely essential to the war effort during the next few weeks, but if the British can give up cargoes temporarily I am sure we can.

I believe the bad effect on the crew, not only of ships in this area but other areas as well, cannot be over estimated. It is going to be very difficult to keep these men at work if the sinkings continue, particularly when they have no escort or other ships in company. Statement by Knox that submarine menace will be in hand by May 1st impresses me as being a

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 2 1972

Action Copy

4/14/42
Naval Aide
gave copy of
this to Admiral
King

CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 14, 1942

M.

From London

To POTUS

Copies furnished as noted:

Page 2, No. 51, April 14th, 1942

very unwise statement at this time. I cannot impress upon you too strongly the concern which all here have in regard to this matter. This is only natural because this island is so dependent on imports and they realize full well the significance of these sinkings to the future of the war.

I need not dwell on the importance of every possible ship to us during the coming months. I had planned to postpone a discussion of this until I could see you, but the matter seems to me to be of such urgency that I decided to take it by cable.

Prime

Action Copy

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 2 1972

AMDI 8
Filed 503p/14
ACM

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CSWD
April 14, 1942,
12:10 P. M.

INCOMING MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ORDER

SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 720314

By RHBR Date MAY 1 1972

From: London,
To: Milid,

No. 2398, April 14th, 1942,

British Chiefs of Staff have just submitted comments on our proposal. From Marshall to McNarney urgent. In substance, there is complete agreement as to 1943 and as to speed up of preparations of boats, assembly of US troops and planes, initiating air offensive this summer and increase in frequency and size of raids. "If Russia is being defeated we may be compelled to make supreme effort to draw off German forces from the Eastern Front. This situation may arise at any time after June. It therefore follows that the sooner American air forces, and particularly American bombers, arrive in this country the greater will be our chance of successful action. The subsequent arrival of American land forces would enable us to reinforce the expeditionary forces on the Continent, if we succeed in establishing a bridgehead".

Following the general presentation is the following as part two of the paper: Measures which must be taken concurrently with our preparation to go on the Continent.

We wish to point out that the action against Germany as outlined in the previous paragraphs may be entirely vitiated unless we take the necessary steps to hold Japan in the meantime.

The extent and rapidity of the Japanese advance has placed us in a perilous position in India, the Indian Ocean and Ceylon. But despite the enormous British interests involved, we should not on the long view feel so concerned at the Japanese advance, were it not for the results it might have on our ability to defeat Germany. We cannot afford that Japan should obtain control of the waters in the Western part of the Indian Ocean as it would have the following results:

NOTE: THE ANSWER TO THIS MESSAGE IS NO. 133 FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MR. HOPKINS FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

COPY No.

10

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 2 No. 2398 From London April 14, 1942.

(A) We should be unable to sustain our forces in the Middle East. Germany would then be able to get access to the oil of Iraq and Iran and to the raw materials of the East, and so be greatly fortified for a very long struggle. (B) We should lose our oil supplies from Abadan. This would be a major disaster since the oil which we and Australia obtain from the Persian and Iraq Oil Fields cannot be replaced from elsewhere owing to shortage of tankers. (C) The Southern supply route to Russia would be cut. This route is likely to be of increasing importance as enemy attacks on the Northern route increase. We have plenty of evidence that the Germans have every intention of bringing a heavy scale of surface, U boat and air attack against the Northern route this summer. (D) Turkey would unquestionably fall an easy prey to the Axis enabling enemy naval forces to enter the Black Sea and so turn the Russian position in the Caucasus. This might lead directly and quickly to the downfall of our Russian ally.

We do not possess enough naval forces, even leaving the barest minimum for our vital commitments in home waters to meet the Japanese forces already operating in the Indian Ocean; not to mention those which may be added to them. We are also very short of aircraft in this theatre.

Accordingly we most urgently require American naval assistance unless the action by the United States Pacific Fleet can be such as to ensure that the Japanese cannot operate strong forces in the Indian Ocean; the only alternative is the USA to send us capital ship and aircraft carrier reinforcements, together with their complement of cruisers and destroyers, so that our Eastern Fleet may be reinforced to such an extent that the Japanese will not dare challenge it in these waters.

Similarly we urgently require American Air Forces, particularly air striking forces, in the Indian theatre, in order that we may ensure the control of sea communications in the waters around Ceylon and on the East coast of India. These are required both to secure our naval base at Ceylon and to prevent the enemy acquiring positions in Southern India from which they could threaten this base. Aircraft

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ORDER

SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 720314

By RAH Date MAY 1 1972 10

~~SECRET~~

COPY No.

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Page three

No. 2398

From London April 14th, 1942

rather than personnel are our primary immediate requirement."

Have Eisenhower and Arnold consider this immediately. Also place it in the hands of Admiral King. Try and get to me as quickly as possible your appreciation and a proposed reply for me.

(ins) Part One of the paper will be cabled later today including the annex.

McClure

ACTION COPY: OPD

INFO. COPY: AG
FILE
SGS
CG AAF
ADM. KING

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ORDER

SFC ARMY BY TAG PER 726314

By RH/Pr Date MAY 1 1972

CM-IN-3714 (4/14/42)

4:50 PM

107

COPY No.

AMDI
filed 915p/14
BM

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
PRIORITY

CSWD
April 14th, 1942
4:29 P. M.

INCOMING MESSAGE

From Ambassador London England
To: Milid G-2

No. 2400, April 14, 1942.

The following is part 1 and annex of "Chiefs of Staff Committee Comments on General Marshall's Memorandum" mentioned in my number 2398. From Marshall to McNarney urgent.

A 1. We have read with great interest and are in general agreement with your outline plan for operations in Western Europe. It fits in with the way we had been thinking and the opportunity afforded by your visit for examination of the plan by your and our staffs, in close and frank consultation has, we think, been invaluable. We should like this close consultation to continue in London.

We agree with the Paramount importance of keeping Russia in the field, and that Western Europe is the most suitable theatre for a major offensive against Germany by the combined forces of the United States of America and Great Britain. There is, therefore, identity of outlook between us both on the short and long term view.

As regards the long term view, we entirely agree that plans should be prepared for major operations on the continent by American and British forces in 1943 on the lines proposed in your paper. It is important that no time should be lost in concerting the necessary plans, and your paper provides a most valuable basis for their preparation. We also agree that, subject to the necessary measures being taken to hold Japan (see paragraphs 13th to 15th below), everything should be concentrated on the main object, is the defeat of Germany.

NOTE: THE ANSWER TO THIS MESSAGE IS NO. 133 FROM THE
PRESIDENT TO MR. HOPKINS FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ORDER

SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 720314

By RHFR Date MAY 1 1972

COPY No. 12

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

From Ambassador London, England
To: MILID G-2

INCOMING MESSAGE

No. 2400, April 14, 1942.

Page 2

As regards the short term view, we feel that we may have an opportunity, indeed that we may be compelled (for the reasons given in paragraph 5) To take some action on the continent this year (1942). Since the weather breaks before the end of September, any such operation must take place sufficiently early to ensure the capture of a port on the continent by the 3rd week in September at latest. In other words, the operation must be launched in August at latest. We recognize that substantial American land forces cannot reach the United Kingdom in time to take part in operations on the continent until September, and therefore that the bulk of any land forces which are engaged in any operation before that date will have to be British. Nevertheless, any American forces, particularly air forces, which can arrive in time to cooperate would be of the greatest value, and might make the difference between success and failure. The reasons are as follows:

Our action in 1942 will be governed by the situation in Russia. This may develop in any of the 3 following ways:
(A) Russia is being defeated; (B) Russia is holding Germany;
(C) Russia is winning. These alternatives are discussed seriatim in the paragraphs that follow.

6. If Russia is being defeated, we may be compelled to make a supreme effort to draw off German Forces from the Eastern Front. This situation might arise any time after June. It therefore follows that the sooner American Air Forces, and particularly heavy bombers, arrive in this country the greater will be our chance of successful action. The subsequent arrival of American land forces would enable us to reinforce the expeditionary force on the continent, if we had succeeded in establishing a Bridgehead. But even if the Russians were to collapse before the American forces had crossed over, they would be invaluable to strengthen the defenses of this country against the invasion which we believe

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ORDER

SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 720314

By REPR Date MAY 1 1972

COPY No. 12

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

From Ambassador London, England

To: G-2

INCOMING MESSAGE

No. 2400, April 14th, 1942.

Page 3

would inevitably follow.

If Russia is holding Germany, it is difficult to see in advance precisely what we should do. On the 1 hand successful action by us on the continent might turn the scale in favour of Russia and expedite ultimate victory. On the other hand, there might be much to be said for delaying such action until 1943. In the first place, the German Army and people would by then be much weaker as a result of enduring another winter; 2ndly the danger of a premature and possibly abortive uprising by the Patriot Armies would be avoided. Since, however, we must be prepared to make action in 1942, the early arrival of American forces is just as necessary as in the previous case.

If Russia is winning, much the same arguments apply as in the last case, with this qualification that if at any time it became clear that Germany was on the point of collapse, we should not hesitate to get on the continent at once. American participation in such an enterprise, whenever it might occur, would clearly be of the greatest value.

Thus, in all 3 cases, American Forces would be of the greatest value, although at this stage it is not possible to foresee the precise circumstance or the precise manner in which they would be employed.

If you agree with our General conception, we should be glad of early information as to the character and extent of the contribution which you could make available before September, and the earliest date by which the various air and land contingents could arrive. The most important requirements for this country are transport aircraft and crews and parachute battalions, while equally important is an additional supply of American fighters for the middle East to enable us to assemble

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ORDER

SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 720314

By RAH Date MAY 1 1972

[REDACTED]

COPY No.

12

WAR DEPARTMENT

from Ambassador London, England

To: G-2

INCOMING MESSAGE

No. 2400, April 14th, 1942.

Page 4

the necessary reserve of British fighters in the United Kingdom.

We cordially agree with your view that considerable training in combined operations is necessary before any forces are launched upon operations on the continent. This can best be done in this country.

As an annex to this Parer, we have set out the steps which we have in hand to prepare ourselves for the various contingencies which may arise in the near future.

Annex: Summary of action already being taken or contemplated.

In the first place, we have put in hand the restoration of our South Coast Ports which had fallen into disuse, and without which no operations on any considerable scale can be launched.

As a further step, in addition to night air attacks which we are delivering at the heart of Germany, we intend to carry out heavy day light raids on the coasts of France and inland on the continent with views forcing the Germans to give battle and so subject their fighter forces to severe wastage. By doing this, we hope to give positive assistance to the Russians on the Eastern Front by drawing off German reserve Sixcray to the West.

We also intend to intensify both the scope and frequency of our seaborne and airborne raids on the enemy's coast line.

We have in addition studied very carefully all operation for seizing a Bridgehead on the coast of France.

Enclosure

ACTION: OPD

INFO COPIES: FILE, SGS, CG AAF

CM-IN-3772 (4/14/42) PM 10:42

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ORDER

SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 720314

By REHER Date MAY 1 1972

COPY No. 12

FD

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London

Dated April 15, 1942

Rec'd 5:47 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1850, April 15, 12 noon

██████████ AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HOPKINS.

At long meeting last night of Defense Council, Chiefs of Staff, former naval person, Marshall and I, British Government agreed to our main proposal. I imagine former naval person will cable you today.

Your message Number 133 getting our immediate attention.

MATTHEWS

KLP

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 2 1972

Cablegram

April 15, 1942

5:52PM M.

From London

T₀ POTUS

Copies furnished as noted:

XXXC 52, April 15, 1942

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72.
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

From Former Naval Person to The President personal
and ~~see~~ number 69.

I must revert to the grave situation in the Indian Ocean mentioned in my number 65, arising from the fact that the Japanese have felt able to detach nearly a third of their battle fleet and half their carriers, which force we are unable to match for several months. The consequences of this may easily be: (A) The loss of Ceylon. (B) Invasion of Eastern India with incalculable internal consequences to our whole war plan and including the loss of Calcutta and of all contact with the Chinese through Burma. But this is only the beginning. Until we are able to fight a fleet action there is no reason why the Japanese should not become the dominating factor in the Western Indian Ocean. This would result in the collapse of our whole position in the Middle East, not only because of the interruption to our convoys to the Middle East and India, but also because of the interruptions to the oil supplies from

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

From _____

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

To _____

MAY 5 1972

M.

Copies furnished as noted:

Page two XXXC 52, April 15, from London

Abadan, without which we cannot maintain our position either at sea or on land in the Indian Ocean Area. Supplies to Russia via the Persian Gulf would also be cut. With so much of the weight of Japan thrown upon us we have more than we can bear.

We had hoped that by the end of April the American Pacific Fleet would be strong enough to reoccupy Pearl Harbor and offer some menace to the Japanese which they would have to consider seriously. At present there seems to be no adequate restraint upon Japanese movements to the West. We are not sure ^{however} ~~moreover~~ whether owing to the great distances even the reoccupation of Pearl Harbor in force by the United States Battle Fleet would necessarily exercise compulsive pressure upon the Japanese High Naval Command. We are deeply conscious of the difficulties of your problem in the Pacific Area.

If you do not feel able to take speedy action which will force Japan to concentrate in the Pacific, the only way out of the immense perils which confront us would

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

From _____

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

To _____

MAY 5 1972

M.

Copies furnished as noted:

Page three XXXC 52, April 15, from London

seem to be to build up as quickly as possible an ample force of modern capital ships and carriers in the Indian Ocean. By substituting one of the 4 R repeat Roger Class now at Kilindini for Malaya in Ironclad it will be possible to send her back to Gibraltar and for renown to reach Admiral Somerville before the end of May. If you would consider sending North Carolina and Ranger from Task Force 22 to join Somerville temporarily, he would be provided with a force of three long range capital ships and 4 carriers as well as the 4 Rogers. In 8 or 9 weeks barring accidents we shall be better off. Illustrious should have joined Somerville by the middle of May and Valiant in June. Nelson and Rodney will be on the way from England. Thus we shall grow continually stronger and regain the power to fight an action in the Indian Ocean against any detachment Japan may dare to make from the Pacific.

Alternatively if you preferred to place North Carolina alongside Washington in Scapa ^{WE} ~~SP~~ could send Duke

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

Page four XXXC 52, April 15, from London

of York to join Somerville in the Indian Ocean and
Ranger could go direct to ^{CAPETOWN to} meet her. The first method
improves our position a fortnight earlier, when days
may count.

We are most grateful to your for sending Washington
and her consorts to help us and for the invaluable work
Wasp is now doing.

It is also most important to have some American heavy
bombers in India. There are at present about 14, and
50 more are authorized. But none of these was able to
attack the Japanese Naval Forces last week. We have
taken everything from Libya which is possible without
ruining all prospects of a renewed offensive. We are
sending every suitable aircraft to the East which can
be efficiently serviced out there, but without your aid
this will not be sufficient. Might I press you, Mr.
President, to procure the necessary decisions query.

I am sending you a separate message about our
memorable meeting with your envoys last night. We have

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From

To

Copies furnished as noted:

Page five XXXC 52, April 15, from London

established the most intimate contacts with the United States Army and Air Force but as Harry will tell you we are not nearly so closely linked up on the Naval side. Yet all depends on this being successfully handled in unison. I am therefore sending the First Sea Lord back with General Marshall and Harry in order that he may discuss with you and Admiral King the whole position and make long term plans. I hope however that if you agree with either of the suggestions for Naval movements made in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this message you will be able to have the necessary orders given without waiting for his arrival. We cannot afford to lose any time.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

AMDI 13
10:34P/April 15
CE

AC-4

Cablegram

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 15, 1942

11:04 PM M.

From London

To POTUS

Copies furnished as noted:

XXXC 53, April 15, 1942

No. 69
Correction POTUS 52. In para 4 change
to read "We could send Duke of York to join
Somerville in the Indian Ocean and Ranger
could go direct to Capetown to meet Her.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tol., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

rcb
AMDI 1
Filed 16th 1010 AM

Cablegram

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 16, 1942

4:30A M.

From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

~~SECRET~~

Copies furnished as noted:

No. XXXC 54 April 16th

Amendment to telegram from Former Naval Person
to President No. 69. Paragraph 2, sentence 3, first
5 words should read "we are not sure however".

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

APRIL 17 1942

422PM M.

From LONDON

To POTUS.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. XXXC 55 APRIL 17TH.

MAY 5 1972

TO PRESIDENT ~~SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL NO SEVENTY PARA ONE.
YOUR ENVOYS WILL TAKE BACK WITH THEM A FULL NOTE OF OUR
MEMORABLE MEETING LAST TUESDAY AND A DETAILED
COMMENTARY ON YOUR PROPOSALS BY OUR CHIEFS OF STAFF.
I THINK, HOWEVER, THAT YOU WOULD WISH TO HAVE AT
ONCE A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE CONCLUSIONS WHICH WERE
REACHED. PARA TWO.
WE WHOLEHEARTEDLY AGREE WITH YOUR CONCEPTION OF
CONCENTRATION AGAINST THE MAIN ENEMY, AND WE
CORDIALLY ACCEPT YOUR PLAN WITH ONE BROAD QUALIFICATION.
AS YOU WILL SEE FROM MY SIXTY NINE OF THE FIFTEENTH
APRIL, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD PREVENT A
JUNCTION OF THE JAPANESE AND THE GERMANS. CONSEQUENTLY,
A PROPORTION OF OUR COMBINED RESOURCES MUST, FOR THE
MOMENT, BE SET ASIDE TO HALT THE JAPANESE ADVANCE.
THIS POINT WAS FULLY DISCUSSED AT THE MEETING, AND
MARSHALL FELT CONFIDENT THAT WE ~~WERE~~ ^{TOGETHER} COULD PROVIDE
WHAT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE INDIAN OCEAN AND OTHER
THEATRES, AND YET GO RIGHT AHEAD WITH YOUR MAIN PROJECT.
PARA THREE. THE CAMPAIGN OF NINETEEN FORTY THREE IS
STRAIGHTFORWARD, AND WE ARE STARTING JOINT PLANS AND

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

SHEET TWO.

M.

From LONDON

To POTUS.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. XXXC 55 APRIL 17TH

PREPARATIONS AT ONCE. WE MAY, HOWEVER, FEEL COMPELLED TO ACT THIS YEAR. YOUR PLAN VISUALISED THIS, BUT PUT MID-SEPTEMBER AS THE EARLIEST DATE. THINGS MAY EASILY COME TO A HEAD BEFORE THEN STOP MARSHALL EXPLAINED THAT YOU HAD BEEN RELUCANT TO PRESS FOR AN ENTERPRISE THAT WAS FRAUGHT WITH SUCH GRAVE RISKS AND DIRE CONSEQUENCES UNTIL YOU COULD MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL AIR CONTRIBUTION; BUT HE LEFT US IN NO DOUBT THAT IF IT WERE FOUND NECESSARY TO ACT EARLIER, YOU, MR PRESIDENT, WOULD EARNESTLY WISH TO THROW IN EVERY AVAILABLE SCRAP OF HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES. WE ARE PROCEEDING WITH PLANS AND PREPARATIONS ON THAT BASIS. BROADLY SPEAKING, OUR AGREED PROGRAMME IS A CRESCENDO OF ACTIVITY ON THE CONTINENT, STARTING WITH AN EVER INCREASING AIR OFFENSIVE BOTH BY NIGHT AND DAY, AND MORE FREQUENT AND LARGER SCALE RAIDS, IN WHICH UNITED STATES TROOPS WILL TAKE PART. PARA FOUR. I AGREE WITH THE SUGGESTION IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO ONE TWENTY NINE OF SECOND APRIL THAT YOU SHOULD ASK STALIN TO SEND TWO SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES TO SEE YOU AT ONCE

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

(SHEET THREE)

M.

From LONDON

To POTUS.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. XXXC 55 APRIL 17TH.

ABOUT YOUR PLANS. IT WILL IN ANY CASE BE IMPOSSIBLE TO CONCEAL THE VAST PREPARATIONS THAT WILL BE NECESSARY, BUT WITH THE WHOLE COAST OF EUROPE, FROM THE NORTH CAPE TO BAYONNE OPEN TO US, WE SHOULD CONTRIVE TO DECEIVE THE ENEMY AS TO THE WEIGHT, TIMING, METHOD AND THE DIRECTION OF OUR ATTACKS. IT IS INDEED FOR CONSIDERATION WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE RIGHT TO MAKE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT THAT OUR TWO NATIONS ARE RESOLVED TO MARCH FORWARD INTO EUROPE TOGETHER IN A NOBLE BROTHERHOOD OF ARMS ON A GREAT CRUSADE FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE TORMENTED PEOPLES. I WILL CABLE YOU FURTHER ON THIS LAST POINT. FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

PRIME.

~~SECRET~~

Action Copy

AMDI 8
18/1127 P
RB

CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 18, 1942

PRIORITY

539 P M.

From LONDON

To POTUS WASHN

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 56, April 18th, 1942

Please make following correction in Prime Ministers Telegram to President No. 70 of 17th April. Begins. Last sentence of paragraph 2 should read "This point was fully discussed at the meeting and Marshall felt confident that we could together provide what was necessary for the Indian Ocean and other theatres and yet go right ahead with your main project".

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEE	PRECEDENCE
FROM	HARRY HOPKINS (LONDON)	FOR ACTION	THE PRESIDENT	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY				ROUTINE
DATE	18 APRIL 1942			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM		INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY				ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY	ROONEY			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

ROONEY

180834 NCR 1714

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRY HOPKINS PERSONAL AND [REDACTED]

AFRICAN MESSAGE RECEIVED TALKED TO FORMER NAVAL
PERSON WHO THINKS MARSHALL AND I SHOULD RETURN
LONDON. DO YOU THINK SITUATION REQUIRES OUR
REMAINING IN ENGLAND UNTIL THIS MATTER CLEARED
UP?

Refer to Pals to Hopkins 17 April 42
(hhr)

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 2 1972

SEALED**SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

AMDI
FLD 10/247AM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 18, 1942

925 P.M.

From London

To The President of the United States

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 57 April 18th

Former naval person to President personal and
~~secret~~ number 71. Your number 134 and also message
number 133 through Harry.

I hope you will send North Carolina over to
join Washington at Scapa. This will enable us to
send Renown immediately and Duke of York as soon as
possible afterwards to join our Eastern Fleet in the
Indian Ocean. This force should prove a strong
deterrent to Japanese attacks upon our convoy route
to Egypt and India. There is no question of our
seeking battle against superior forces, but we do not
want to be sought out and found at a disadvantage.
Admiralty information concurs with yours that there
are indications that Japanese carriers have gone
eastwards to replenish with aircraft after their severe
losses at Colombo and Trimcomalee. All the more is
there reason to use this lull to get into a sounder
position.

As regards air reinforcements for Burma India and
Ceylon Portal has drafted the note in my immediately
following telegram after full discussion with Marshall

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., St. Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

Sheet Two of No. 57 from London

M.

From

To

Copies furnished as noted:

and his officer. On this basis therefore welcome use you propose for Ranger and hope movement may go forward full speed as you kindly suggest.

I also have had a long painful message from the Generalissimo but I do not know what can be done beyond the measures now set on foot including especially the replenishment of A V G Alexander has done very well but his force is now little more than ten thousand effectives and if the Japanese continue to land new divisions it is only a question of time before they enter China from the South.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt.. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

AMDI

FLD 19/322AM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 18, 1942

952P M.

From London

To The President of the United States

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 58 April 18th

Former naval person to President personal and
[redacted] number 72 following is note by Portal to which I
refer in paragraph 2 of my immediately preceding
telegram:

The air force suggestions referred to in the
President's telegram to the Prime Minister number 134
have been discussed by me with Marshall after careful
joint examination by our respective staff officers. I
agree that the quickest and soundest means of building
up an air striking force is to bring U S bombardment
squadrons now in India up to full strength. It is welcome
news to hear of 30 American ~~Forces~~ ^{Fortress} and Liberator and
16 B 25 aircraft already in or nearing India. To provide
this force with a full reserve for immediate purposes I
have agreed to transfer 34 heavy and medium bomber air-
craft from British allocations. I have asked that these
should be returned to us as early as possible as we
ourselves are shortly forming 2 Liberator squadrons in
India and another 3 either in Middle East or India as
soon as possible afterwards. Nearly all the Liberator
aircraft we are getting will be required for this purpose.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

_____M.

From _____ Sheet Two of Number 58 from London

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

I should be only too willing to release Kittyhawk aircraft for Ranger for despatch in Ranger were it not that this would mean taking grave risks in Middle East and possibly compromising the coming offensive. Egypt is now more than ever dependent on this type because of large despatches of Hurricane fighters to India. I hope this will not prevent the use of Ranger as the President suggests. In case sufficient American aircraft for A V G are not available perhaps it would be possible to use any vacant space to hasten shipment of Kittyhawk destined for Middle East but at present waiting for ships.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

~~SECRET~~

Action Copy

ACM

Filed 1054A/19

AMDI 1

Cablegram

CSWD

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 19, 1942,

5: 03 A.M.

From London,

To Potus,

Copies furnished as noted:

No. XXXC 59, April 19th, 1942,

Correction our number 58 Prime Minister
number 72. Change last sentence para 1 to
read 30 American Fortress repeat Fortress and
Liberator.

Prime.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

AMDI 6
filed 341p/20th
Las

Cablegram

URGENT

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 20, 1942

10:06 A. M.

From London

To President of the United States

Copies furnished as noted:

No 61 April 20th, 1942.

From former naval person to the President number 73 the Ambassador and the heads of our missions in Washington tell me that it may be necessary to create some combined bodies for dealing with supplies in addition to those we set up at Christmas. One example is food while our long range programs of war production are also not yet covered by the existing machinery.

But if to the existing raw materials and shipping combined boards we add 2 or 3 additional bodies, it appears that some means of pulling together all the inter allied groups (other than the Chiefs of Staff) in order to get overall direction may be needed. I find that Harry Hopkins and our representatives are agreed about the need for a central focus of this kind.

We must in any case make some fresh appointments in connection with our various supply organizations in Washington. If, on your hearing Harry Hopkins report of his talks with us, you agree about the desirability of setting up a single controlling body over the combined boards, I would at once appoint a representative with the

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

By R. H. Parks

Date

MAY

5 1972

Action Copy

REPRODUCED FROM - AMERICAN SILENT BOOK CO., INC., NIAKKA FALLS, N.Y.

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

[REDACTED]

M.

From

To

Copies furnished as noted:

Page 2 Number 61 from London April 20th

Appropriate status to work with your nominee.

PRIME

Action Copy

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 5 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

This thing is being worked on and when I get back we will be able to send a wire on this. I hope it will not be sent before I get back.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

AMDI 11
filed 826PM/20th
Las

Cablegram

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

Priority

April 20, 1942.

2:37 P. M.

From London

To President of the United States

Copies furnished as noted:

No 62 April 20th, 1942.

Former naval person to President personal and

No 74 will you kindly consider whether you should not now make an offer to Petain and or Darlan of British and American support if they will carry the French Fleet to Africa? Should you favour such a policy I will cable you exactly what we could put in on invitation to Morocco unopposed, and at what dates. It seems to me they ought to be offered blessings as well as cursings

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

AMDI 1
filed 1051A/24
AE

Cablegram

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

URGENT

April 24, 1942

5:18 A. M.

From London

To The President of the United States

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 63, April 24th

To President from Former Naval Person. [REDACTED] and
Personal. Number 75. XXXC.

In your Number 131 of April 3rd you said that
you felt that it would be unwise to do anything which
would give the impression that Ironclad was a joint
Anglo American enterprise. In the situation which
then existed I agreed with you: But now that Laval
has come into power at Vichy and you have withdrawn
Leahy, are not things different?

In these changed circumstances, would you be
prepared to reconsider your previous decision, and
allow us to drop leaflets both at Ironclad and in
France which would give the impression that American was
associated with the expedition, and that, conjointly
with Great Britain, she guaranteed the return of Ironclad
to France after the War?

Prime.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

AMDI 2
24/115P
dj

CABLEGRAM

C-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 24, 1942

735A M.

From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Copies furnished as noted:

~~SECRET~~
No. XXXC 64 April 24, 1942

Former Naval person to President personal and
~~SECRET~~ number 76.

In my immediately following telegram is a note drafted by me on 22nd for Defense Committee and accepted by them. It should explain to you how we are planning to act. I beg that this may be for you and Admiral King alone.

I am deeply anxious about Malta under the unceasing bombardment of 450 1st line German aircraft. If the island fortress is to hold out till the June convoy, which is the earliest possible, it must have a continued flow of Spitfires. The last flying off from Wasp was most successful, although unhappily the enemys attack broke up many after they had landed. We are using Eagle to send in 15 or so at a time. I shall be grateful if you will allow Wasp to do a 2nd trip. We will of course escort with Renown as before. I do not think enemy have the slightest idea Wasp has been in and out of the Mediterranean. Without this aid I fear Malta will be pounded to bits. Meanwhile its defense is wearing out the enemys air force and effectively aiding Russia.

Para 3 will follow later.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

~~SECRET~~

Action Copy

AMDI 4
24/209P
dj

CABLEGRAM

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 24, 1942

824A M.

From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Copies furnished as noted:

No. XXXC 66 April 24, 1942

Paragraph 3 of message number 76. We cordially accept the proposals which Admiral King has made to the First Sea Lord about the dispositions of American heavy ships in the Atlantic.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

AMDI 3
24/157P
dj

CABLEGRAM

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 24, 1942

804A M.

From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Copies furnished as noted:

No. XXXC 65 April 24, 1942

Former Naval person to President personal and number 77.

1. No satisfactory solution of the Malta problem is available in May. The island must therefore hold out till the June dark period. This should be possible if rigorous severity of rationing is imposed from now and the supply of Spitfires by Wasp and Eagle is maintained.

2. We must not be deterred from Ironclad, for which such long preparations have been made, by the changes in the French government. However, it would be wise to have both Renown and Duke of York handy either at Gibraltar or in home waters till we see the reactions upon Vichy France.

3. The month gained by Malta holding out till the Middle of June and the dropping of the idea of a convoy from the west (A) eases the strain upon the Commander in Chief, Home Fleet by narrowing the gap between Rodney and Nelson being ready for action and any departure of Duke of York: (B) enables the May convoy to Russia to be run thus relieving a most dangerous congestion and avoiding failing Stalin at the most critical juncture.

4. All the above is very convenient in the west but is gained at the expense of the Command of the Indian Ocean. However, we were not going to get that anyhow until late in June. It is suggested therefore that the assembly of the Eastern Fleet should be fixed for 30th June, by which date, barring accidents, Duke of York, Renown, Warspite, Valiant, and 3 armored aircraft carriers and the 4 Rogers should all be present. Here would be a fleet which, if not strong enough to fight the Japanese Navy, would at any rate be capable of dealing with a very heavy detachment. We may have to pay forfeits in the Indian Ocean in consequence of enemy action, but we are running these risks now and would have

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks

Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

M.

From

To

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

Page2 No. XXXC 65 from London 4/24

to anyhow for 5 weeks to come. We shall have to go on running the risks for another 4.

5. What should Admiral Somerville do in the meanwhile? First he is to cover Ironclad for which he is not ill equipped with the 3 carriers, Warspite and the 4 Rogers. This is all provided for in his orders and he is already on the way via Colombo.

6. After Ironclad is over, it is hoped about the 10th May, he should work his way North to fuel at Aden in the early days of June. By this time we shall know what has happened to General Auchinlecks offensive. If he has got Martuba or Benghazi, the chances of a Malta convoy getting through from the East will be greatly improved. We shall also know how much of the German Air Force has been drawn away from the Mediterranean to the South Russian front, the actual moves that have taken place or are in progress. We can also judge the situation in the Indian Ocean as it then appears, observing that we cannot fight a fleet action anyhow except against a minor detachment. The decision can then be taken whether or not to escort the convoy in strength from the East through the Mediterranean or sail southwards again to meet the Duke of York and Renown and pick up Valiant for the eastern fleet assembly on June 30th.

7. Should the decision be to make a dart into the Mediterranean and see the convoy through in style, Admiral Somerville should proceed with all 3 aircraft carriers and Warspite with auxiliaries through the canal where the convoy should be assembled. This convoy must be worthy of the effort and risk required to put it through. At least 7 supply ships can now be loaded at Alexandria. If all goes well, there will still be time for Admiral Somerville to come back through the canal and make the general fleet rendezvous on the 30th June at Colombo or wherever is convenient.

~~SECRET~~

PRIME

Action Copy

AMSDI 11
24/708P
dj

CABLEGRAM

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

URGENT

April 24, 1942

105P M.

From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Copies furnished as noted:

No. XXXC 67 April 24, 1942

Former Naval person to President no. 78.

With regard to what you say in your telegram number 139 about Molotov's journeyings, I have had message from Stalin saying he is sending M here to discuss certain divergences in draft texts of our agreement, which he wants settled as soon as possible. He may even be already on his way. You will understand that I cannot now suggest to him a change in the order of his visits. If and when, therefore, Molotov bears down upon us, I propose to agree to a discussion of our drafts and would hope to clear main difficulties out of the way. But I will suggest to him that he should then go on to Washington and see you before anything is finally signed.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

AMDI 7
filed 25/647P
dj

CABLEGRAM

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 25, 1942

1251P M.

From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Copies furnished as noted:

No. XXXC 68 April 25, 1942

From former Naval person to President no. 79.
Your 140. Thank you so much.

PRIME

Action Copy

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

AMDT 10
Filed 28/438P
DEG

CABLEGRAM

CSWD

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 28, 1942

11:13 A. M.

From AMEMBASSY LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Copies furnished as noted:

Number 70, April 28, 1942

From Former Naval Person to President personal
and no. 80.

Your no. 141.

Eden has been dealing with this for me in consultation with first Sea Lord and Leathers. Following is the position. Voyage of each of these convoys now entails major fleet operation. With the best will in the world cycle of convoys cannot be more than 3 in 2 months. One convoy (P.Q. 15), limited to 25 merchant ships, has just sailed. In view of what you tell me we are ready to consider, in the light of the experience gained in this convoy, whether the number of merchant ships in future convoys can be increased to as many as 35. Convoy should reach North Russian ports in about 10 days time. Meanwhile we are arranging for 35 merchant ships to be loaded for the next convoy (P.Q. 16), due to leave Iceland (C) on the 17th May. But 35 is the absolute maximum number which it is safe to risk without further experience of the scale of enemy attack.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 5-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

To

By R. H. Parks

Date

MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

Page #2. Number 70 from London.

It is not clear from your telegram whether you have seen the contents of Leathers letter to Harriman of 25th April which were telegraphed to Hopkins the same day. This explains that even if size of the convoys is limited to 25 merchant ships each there will be 75 ships carrying supplies to Russia every 2 months, of which 24 are sufficient to lift protocol supplies from the United Kingdom, leaving 51, including tankers, available to carry supplies from the USA in each 2-monthly period. We estimate that, apart from food, the protocol calls for about 150,000 short tons per month from the USA. Deducting 10,000 tons from this for deliveries via the Persian Gulf, and proceeding on the assumption that each ship will carry on the average 6,000 short tons, not more than 24 ships per month (I E 48 in the 2 months) would be required to lift your quotas, leaving a margin of 2 or 3 for tankers and food supplies.

But the assumption that each ship can carry on the average 6,000 short tons presupposes that the cargo is

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From _____

To _____

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

Page #3. Number 70 from London. [REDACTED]

stowed in such a way as to ensure that the highest priority goods are loaded into a much smaller number of ships than is now employed. Hitherto ships have been carrying about half this tonnage. This is a waste we can neither of us afford. The only possible course to adopt in order to work off the present accumulation at Iceland (C) is therefore to bring to the United Kingdom most of the 16 ships now waiting there, and also some of the 50 American and Russian ships which are on their way across the Atlantic. These would be discharged and restowed. In our view this is the only possible course if the most important cargo is to reach Russia in the largest possible volume at an early date.

I hope this may meet your views. We are at our utmost strain for convoys escorts.

PRIME

Action Copy

ANDY 12
Filed 847P/28
DEG

CABLEGRAM

CSWD

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

URGENT

April 28, 1942

253 P. M.

From AMEMBASSY LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Copies furnished as noted:

NUMBER 71, April 28, 1942

From Former Naval Person to President personal
and no. 81.

We have given further thought to ironclad, and we feel that, in order to reduce to a minimum the risk of wavlike reaction by Vichy, it is essential that you should come in fully behind us immediately the operation has taken place.

What we would ask is that in addition: (1) To authorising leaflets as proposed in my telegram no. 59, you should (2) if possible send a token United States detachment to join the occupying forces as soon as possible: (3) In any event inform the Vichy government immediately the operation has taken place that the operation has your approval and support, and (4) immediately make public that such a communication has been made Vichy.

If I might make a suggestion, your communication to Vichy (which might be made to the French Ambassador in Washington on the morning of zero day) might be on

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Page #2. Number 71 from London. April 28, 1942

the following lines: -The United States Government wish to inform the French Government that the occupation by British forces of Ironclad, which as been undertaken to forestall occupation by the enemy, has the full approval and support of the United States Government. In order to make this claim, the United States Government will take an early opportunity to send United States forces to participate in the occupation. The United States and British Governments jointly undertake to restore Ironclad to France after the war. The United States Government also wish to make it plain that any war-like act permitted by Vichy against Great Britain in consequence of the occupation would be regarded by the United States Government as an attack upon the United Nations as a whole, from which the United States Government would draw the necessary consequences and take the appropriate action.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

PRIME

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

URGENT

April 29, 1942

11:23 A M.

From American Embassy LondonTo The President of the United States

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 73, April 29, 1942.

From former Naval Person to President Personal
and secret No. 82.

Most grateful for your telegram about Ironclad,
for which all goes forward. Also for allowing Wasp
to have another good sting.

I am highly interested in escape of General
Giraud and his arrival at Vichy. This man might play
a decisive part in bring about things of which you
had hopes. Please tell me anything you know.

We have made 2 desperate attacks on Tirpitz at
Trondheim. Results of 1st, no damage, but 2nd is
more hopeful. Will let you know when photographs
are developed late tonight. We are keeping the air
fighting up at full intensity. German retaliation
strikes at towns near the coast which have no flak.
Numbers are moderate and pilots sometimes make 2nd
journeys. Monday night we got 3 out of 20 on
Norwich, and last night 5 out of 20 on York, all
shot down by night fighters.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____ REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
To _____ By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 73, April 29, 1942.

Page 2

B

I have had a telegram from Curtin saying that General MacArthur has asked him to request me "To divert to Australia the 2nd British Infantry Division which will be rounding the Cape during the latter part of April and the beginning of May, and also the Armoured Division which is to round the Cape 1 month later. The Diversion, he says, would be of a temporary nature, and these Forces would remain in Australia only until such time as the 9th Australian Imperial Force Division and the remainder of the 6th Division are returned." I should not be able to send these Forces to Australia unless it is definitely invaded by 8 or 10 Japanese Divisions. They are all urgently needed in India. I fear this is a prelude to the recall of the Australian 9th Division.

General MacArthur also asks for a British Aircraft Carrier, pointing out that it is wasteful to operate an unbalanced Naval Force. He further requests an additional allocation of shipping on

C

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 73, April 29, 1942.

Page 3

the Australian - American Run, stating that the present amount of 250,000 tons is quite inadequate to complete requisite defence strength apart from offensive action.

I should be glad to know whether these requirements have been approved by you or the Washington Pacific Defence Council, and whether General MacArthur has any authority from the United States for taking such a line. We are quite unable to meet these new demands which are none the less a cause of concern when put forward on General MacArthurs authority.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

REF ID: A670-480

~~SECRET~~

Churchill folder
April 30, 1942.

Date: MAR 2 1972

Signature: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Dispatch from the Prime Minister.

Admiral King has handed to me the Prime Minister's recent dispatch to you, with certain passages marked for my comment or suggested answers, which are to serve as a basis for your reply to Mr. Churchill. In this connection I am at a loss to explain the reference to General Giraud. This French General, who was a prisoner of the Germans, is reported to have escaped, but so far as we know has gone to Berne and not to Vichy as stated by the Prime Minister.

No. 144
With respect to other marked portions of the message I suggest a reply as follows:

"It seems probable to me that the request made upon you by Mr. Curtin for two divisions and for additional marine assistance was made upon his own responsibility although ~~undoubtedly~~ *probably* based upon conversations with General MacArthur. The directive under which General MacArthur holds his command provides that the United States Chiefs of Staff will constitute the executive agency through which orders are to be passed to him, and we had assumed that any request of his for reinforcement would be directed here. However, the command set-up in Australia is complex and understandings in certain details are reached only as they arise, and it is therefore possible that both Mr. Curtin and General MacArthur felt it proper to make request for British assistance directly upon the British Government.

"We have previously replied to a message from General MacArthur informing him that additional airplane carriers are not now available for assignment to the Southwest Pacific. Only today we received another request for a number of ships desired for coastwise and local transportation in Australia, but we had no knowledge of any special need for additional trans-Pacific shipping, nor for the two British Divisions now at sea. I agree with you these should go to India and I hope Mr. Curtin's request is not a mere preliminary to an insistence upon the return home of the 9th Australian Division. As you know, in accepting, some time ago, your suggestion that we send an additional division to the Australians, we did so in the hope that they would then feel able to leave one of their own in the Middle East.

"I have had no official information concerning Giraud's alleged escape. My only information has come from the press.

[REDACTED]

"We will instruct General MacArthur, immediately, that his future requests for reinforcements, except for routine supply which should follow accustomed channels, will be processed to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. Where your forces are concerned, we will then communicate with the British Chiefs of Staff. With this arrangement definitely prescribed and understood, you will know that any request reaching you from Mr. Curtin is made upon his own responsibility."

A message to General MacArthur, agreeable to the above, is going out immediately.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff.

If you think it advisable I will express the hope to Mr. Curtin that he will not ask the return of any of his troops from The Near East.

This despatch is in reference to your No. 82.

[Signature]

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- MAR 2 1972

Signature- *[Signature]*

May 2, 1942.

FROM: OPNAV
TO : AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON [REDACTED] AND PERSONAL NO. 145.

I REFER TO YOUR PERSONAL AND SECRET DESPATCH NO. EIGHTY-FIVE AND FEEL THAT, FOLLOWING EXCHANGE OF DESPATCHES BETWEEN ADMIRAL POUND AND ADMIRAL KING, IT IS NOW ESSENTIAL FOR US TO ACQUIESCE IN YOUR VIEWS REGARDING RUSSIAN CONVOYS BUT CONTINUE TO HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO KEEP CONVOYS AT STRENGTH OF THIRTY-FIVE SHIPS.

WE PROPOSE TO PRESS RUSSIANS TO REDUCE REQUIREMENTS TO ABSOLUTE ESSENTIALS ON GROUNDS THAT PREPARATIONS FOR BOLERO WILL REQUIRE ALL POSSIBLE MUNITIONS AND SHIPPING.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1550, May 2, 1942.

John L. McCREA
JOHN L. McCREA
Captain
Aide

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *W.S. Stewart*
Date *OCT 12 1971*

AMDI 3
filed 1/2PM
MP

Cablegram

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

May 1, 1942

7:47 A. M.

From Am Embassy, London

To The President of the United States

Copies furnished as noted:

No. XXXC 74, May 1, 1942

From former Naval person to President
Number 83 many thanks for your message Number 143.
We shall of course examine King's proposals with
the utmost care the moment they arrive.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

The President to former Naval Person 5/2/42

No. 145

I refer to your personal and secret despatch
number Eighty Five and ~~now~~ feel that
comma following exchange of despatches
between Admiral Pound and Admiral King
comma it is now essential for us to
acquiesce in your views regarding Russian
Convoys but continue to hope that you
will be able to keep convoys at strength
of 35 ships para we propose to press
Russians to reduce requirements to absolute
essentials on grounds that preparations for
Bolero will require all possible munitions

Received
and Shipping

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

May 1, 1942

1:47 P.M.

From EMBASSY LONDON

To The President of the United States

Copies furnished as noted:

No 75 May 1, 1942

From former Naval Person to President personal
and ~~secret~~. No 84.

Thank you for your telegram number 142 which is of great help to us. We have drafted terms which we propose that the force Commander should, if he can, put to the Governor at the earliest possible moment. After stating that the territory cannot be allowed to suffer the fate of Indo China and that it should be made available to those forces which are fighting to restore freedom of the world and secure the liberation of France and French Territory, the Governor is summoned to surrender the territory unconditionally and is given the following assurances. The territory will remain French. Those who elect to return to France will be repatriated as opportunity offers. The salaries and pensions of all officials who elect to cooperate will be provided for. Trade with the United Nations will be restored and the territory will receive all the economic benefits accorded to those French Territories which have already joined the United Nations.

In view of your telegram, I am including a statement that the operation has the full approval of The Government of The United States, unless I hear from you that you see objection to this.

In addition to your communication to the French Ambassador in Washington I would urge that it is essential that the same message should also be delivered to Petain or Laval at the earliest possible moment in order that they may know what is afoot before the news reaches Vichy from Ironclad. I would suggest that you telegraph the text of your communication EN Clair to Mr. Tuck as soon as you hear from us that the operation has been launched. This will be done by code word through Field Marshal Dill, and if all goes well the news should reach you between 8:00 PM and 11:00 PM Eastern Standard time on Monday, 4th May.

Action Copy

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

REPRODUCED FROM AMERICAN SALES BOOK CO., INC., NIAGARA FALLS, N.Y.

By R. H. Parks

Date

MAY 5 1972

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From LONDON

To The President of the United States

Copies furnished as noted:

Message No 75 - Page 2 -

This will mean that your ^{man} Mac at Vichy will have to act any
time after 3:00 AM Tuesday, 5th May Vichy Local Time.

If for any reason, such as weather, the operation
has to be postponed, the force Commander will naturally
maintain wireless silence and we shall receive no news
for 24 or perhaps 48 hours.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

[REDACTED]
TO: LONDON

NO. 146

PERSONAL AND [REDACTED] FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM
THE PRESIDENT.

REPLY TO YOUR 87.

IT NOW APPEARS THAT DELIVERY OF CARRIER FIGHTERS WILL FAIL
TO MEET OUR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS IN 1942 SO THAT THE LOANING OF
THE MARTLETS TO YOU WOULD MERELY MEAN THAT OUR OWN CARRIERS WERE
TO THE SAME DEGREE NOT EQUIPPED. I AM PUTTING EVERY PRESSURE ON
DELIVERY OF CARRIER FIGHTERS AND HOPE OUR PRODUCTION RATE CAN BE
INCREASED.

PLANS ARE BEING PUSHED TO TRAIN, EQUIP AND MOVE AIR TRANSPORT
UNITS TO THE U.K. AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. THE PRESENT SCHEDULE
AND THE PROBABILITY IS: FOR JUNE TWO GROUPS OF 52 PLANES EACH;
FOR JULY TWO ADDITIONAL GROUPS, MAKING A TOTAL OF 208 TRANSPORT
PLANES. THIS IS AN ADVANCE OF ONE MONTH ON THE ORIGINAL SCHEDULE.
IT IS PLANNED TO AUGMENT THIS AIR TRANSPORT FORCE BY FOUR ADDITIONAL
GROUPS BY NOVEMBER, 1942, PROVIDING A GRAND TOTAL OF 416 PLANES.
TRANSPORT GROUPS ON REACHING ENGLAND WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO
ASSIST THE BRITISH FORCES BOTH IN OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.

THE IMPORTANCE OF AIRBORNE TROOPS IN OPERATIONS IS FULLY
APPRECIATED AND WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ACCELERATE THE
RATE AT WHICH AIR TRANSPORT CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE IN ENGLAND.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.S. Stewart
Date OCT 12 1971

146

- 2 -

I WELCOME THE INVITATION FOR OUR PARACHUTISTS AND AIRBORNE TROOPS TO TRAIN IN THE U.K. ALONGSIDE YOURS; A BATTALION OF PARACHUTISTS WILL BE SENT IN JUNE. THE REMAINDER OF THE 1st ARMORED DIVISION AND THE FIRST SERIAL OF GENERAL SPAATZ'S 8th AIR FORCE WILL COMPLETE THE JUNE SHIPMENT. --I AM PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO START OUR AIR UNITS OPERATING WITH YOURS ON THE OFFENSIVE AND TO GET SOME OF OUR GROUND TROOPS TRAINED IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS THIS SUMMER.

Roosevelt

1711

5/16/42

Released

J. L. McCann

Aide

AMDI 15
2/430A
dj

CABLEGRAM

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

May 1, 1942

1048P M.

From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 76 XXXC May 1st, 1942

Former Naval person to President personal and

No. 85.

With very great respect what you suggest is beyond our power to fulfil. Admiral King has expressed opinion that our transatlantic escorts are already too thin. Reduction proposed would dislocate convoy system for 8 weeks during which if enemy switched from your east coast to mid ocean disastrous consequences might follow to our main life line.

moreover difficulty of Russian convoys cannot be solved merely by anti submarine craft. Enemy heavy ships and destroyers may at any time strike. Even on this present P convoy we have been attacked by hostile destroyers which were beaten off with damage to one of ours. Edinburgh, one of our best 6 inch cruisers has been badly damaged by U-boats and is being towed to Murmansk where Trinidad, damaged last convoy, is still pinned. Just now I have received news that King George V has collided with our

Action Copy

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 5-29-72
By R. H. Parks

Date
MAY 5 1972

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From

To

Copies furnished as noted:

Page 2 No. 76 XXXC from London May 1st, 1942
destroyer Punjabi, Punjabi being sunk and her depth
charges exploding have damaged King George V.
Difficulty of Russian convoy escorts is therefore
at least as much surface ships of high fighting
quality as of anti submarine craft. We have made
desperate attacks on Tirpitz in Trondheim but alas
although near the target have not achieved any damage.

I beg you not to press us beyond our judgment
in this operation which we have studied most intently
and of which we have not yet been able to measure the
full strain. I can assure Mr. President we are
absolutely extended and I could not press the
Admiralty further.

6 ships from Iceland have already arrived at the
Clyde and their reloading ought to begin forthwith. 3
convoys every 2 months with either 35 or 25 ships in
each convoy according to experience represent extreme
limit of what we can handle. Pound is cabling separately
to Admiral King.

PRIME

Action Copy

RECEIVED-1972-AMERICAN SALES BOOK CO., INC., NICHOLS FALLS, N.Y.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date 5 1972

MAY 19, 1942

SECRET
TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: PRESIDENT

NO. 147

I HAVE BEEN GIVING A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT TO THE ALLOCATION OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURED HERE. IT IS MY CLEAR CONVICTION THAT EXCEPT FOR A REASONABLE NUMBER IN THE BRITISH ISLES ALL RESERVE PLANES SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM A RESERVE STATUS WHICH IS IN FACT AN INACTIVE STATUS IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN MAXIMUM AND CONTINUOUS AIR IMPACT ON THE ENEMY.

I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND OUR GREAT DESIRE TO MAKE THE MOST EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO OUR COMBINED WAR EFFORT IN EVERY APPROPRIATE THEATER TO THE LIMIT OF OUR GROWING CAPACITY. I AM CONFIDENT THAT OUR RESPECTIVE AIR FORCES CAN ADAPT THEMSELVES IN ESSENTIAL COOPERATION WITH OUR RESPECTIVE GROUND AND SEA FORCES WHENEVER AND WHEREVER THE COMMON CAUSE CAN BE ADVANCED. TODAY IT IS EVIDENT THAT UNDER CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS THE U. S. IS GOING TO HAVE INCREASING TRAINED AIR PERSONNEL IN EXCESS OF COMBAT PLANES IN SIGHT FOR THEM TO USE. WE ARE THEREFORE ANXIOUS THAT EVERY APPROPRIATE AMERICAN-MADE AIRCRAFT BE MANNED AND FOUGHT BY OUR OWN CREWS. EXISTING SCHEDULES OF AIRCRAFT ALLOCATIONS DO NOT PERMIT US TO DO THIS.

NOT ONLY ARE PRESENT CONDITIONS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE LEND-LEASE ARRANGEMENTS OF LAST YEAR BUT THEY ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE ARRIVED AT IN THE SO-CALLED

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By

W. J. Stewart


Date

OCT 12 1971


ARNOLD-PORTAL AGREEMENT OF THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING OUR ENTRY INTO THE WAR. ONE EXAMPLE OF THIS DIFFERENCE OF SITUATION IS THE CURRENT POSITION OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND NOW AND AS OF FIVE MONTHS AGO.

MY THOUGHT IS THAT THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, WITH YOUR APPROVAL AND MINE, WOULD DETERMINE THE STRENGTH OF AIRCRAFT TO BE MAINTAINED IN THE RESPECTIVE THEATERS OF WAR. I THINK THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PLANES POSSIBLE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN COMBAT AND THE MINIMUM NUMBER CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY BE HELD IN RESERVE AND IN OPERATIONAL TRAINING UNITS, AND THAT AMERICAN PILOTS AND CREWS BE ASSIGNED TO MAN AMERICAN-MADE PLANES FAR MORE GREATLY THAN AT PRESENT ON THE COMBAT FRONTS.

I PROPOSE THAT ARNOLD AND TOWERS GO TO LONDON AT ONCE WITH EVILL TO MEET WITH PORTAL AND THE APPROPRIATE AIR OFFICER OF THE ADMIRALTY TO DISCUSS THE VERY IMPORTANT DETAILS IMPLIED IN THE BROAD POLICY EXPRESSED IN THIS MESSAGE. I WOULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT PORTAL RETURN HERE WITH ARNOLD EVILL AND TOWERS FOR THE FINAL DISCUSSION.


ROOSEVELT

RELEASED 2300 MAY 19


G. M. ELSEY
WATCH OFFICER

reb

Cablegram

CSWD

ANDI 8

Filed 8/1258 AM

Inclen
Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

May 7, 1942

707P M.

From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

Copies furnished as noted:

No. XXXC 77 May 7th

Former Naval Person to President No. 86.

Delighted to hear your good news from the
Solomons.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

Burl

MAY 19, 1942

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: PRESIDENT

NO. 147

~~I~~ I HAVE BEEN GIVING A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT TO THE ALLOCATION OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURED HERE.

No 9 ~~IT IS OUR CONSIDERED~~ *my clear* CONVICTION THAT ~~PLANE~~ *except for a reasonable number in the British Isles all reserve* PLANES

should be removed from ~~MAINTAINED IN A RESERVE STATUS~~ *which is* ~~IN FACT~~ *in order to strengthen* ~~AN INACTIVE STATUS~~ IN REGARD TO THE PARAMOUNT OBJECTIVE OF MAXIMUM AND CONTINUOUS AIR IMPACT ON THE ENEMY.

Q ~~I~~ I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND OUR GREAT DESIRE TO MAKE THE MOST EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO OUR COMBINED WAR EFFORT IN EVERY APPROPRIATE THEATER TO THE LIMIT OF OUR GROWING CAPACITY.

~~I~~ I AM CONFIDENT THAT OUR RESPECTIVE AIR FORCES CAN ADAPT THEMSELVES IN ESSENTIAL COOPERATION WITH OUR RESPECTIVE GROUND AND SEA FORCES WHENEVER AND WHEREVER THE COMMON CAUSE CAN BE ADVANCED.

No 9. Today ~~IT IS EVIDENT THAT UNDER CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS~~ *the U.S. is* ~~WE ARE~~ GOING TO HAVE INCREASING TRAINED AIR PERSONNEL IN EXCESS OF COMBAT PLANES IN SIGHT FOR THEM *to use.* WE ARE THEREFORE ANXIOUS THAT EVERY APPROPRIATE AMERICAN-MADE AIRCRAFT BE MANNED AND FOUGHT BY OUR OWN CREWS.

EXISTING SCHEDULES OF AIRCRAFT ALLOCATION ⁵ DO NOT PERMIT US TO DO THIS.

Q ~~3~~ NOT ONLY ARE PRESENT CONDITIONS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE LEND-LEASE ARRANGEMENTS OF LAST YEAR BUT THEY ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE ARRIVED AT IN THE SO-CALLED

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. S. Stewart

Date OCT 12 1971

ARNOLD-PORTAL AGREEMENT OF THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING OUR ENTRY INTO THE WAR. ONE EXAMPLE OF THIS DIFFERENCE OF SITUATION IS THE CURRENT POSITION OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND NOW AND AS OF FIVE MONTHS AGO.

~~A~~ MY THOUGHT IS THAT THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, WITH YOUR APPROVAL AND MINE, WOULD DETERMINE THE STRENGTH OF AIRCRAFT TO BE MAINTAINED IN THE RESPECTIVE THEATERS OF WAR. ~~I REPEAT AND FIRM BELIEVE THAT~~ ^{I think} THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PLANES POSSIBLE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN COMBAT AND THE MINIMUM NUMBER CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY BE HELD IN RESERVE AND IN OPERATIONAL TRAINING UNITS, *and that American pilots*

~~A~~ I PROPOSE THAT ARNOLD AND TOWERS GO TO LONDON AT ONCE WITH EVILL TO MEET WITH PORTAL AND THE APPROPRIATE AIR OFFICER OF THE ADMIRALTY TO DISCUSS THE VERY IMPORTANT DETAILS IMPLIED IN THE BROAD POLICY EXPRESSED IN THIS MESSAGE. I WOULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT PORTAL RETURN HERE WITH ARNOLD EVILL AND TOWERS FOR THE FINAL DISCUSSION. *And even be assigned to man*

ROOSEVELT

*American
makes planes
far more
privately than
at present on
the combat
fronts.*

CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

May 12, 1942

7:15 A M.

From London

To The President of the United States
White House

Copies furnished as noted:

Number 78, May 12th, 1942. XXXC

Number 87 Former Naval Person to President
personal and ~~secret~~.

Para 1. The evidence at present available shows that Japanese carriers are equipped with striking forces of fighter dive bombers in large numbers. Hitherto we have assessed our fighter strength as that necessary to meet the torpedo carrier or large dive bomber of which a considerably lesser number can be operated by the enemy. It is necessary to increase our own fighter aircraft strength in Eastern fleet carriers.

Para 2. Your very generous help in the delivery of fighter aircraft will permit us to operate a large increase for a time but owing to our quota ending this September and not restarting until 1943 we cannot continue to operate the fighter strength desired. A loan of 200 Martlets (which are the ideal aircraft for the purpose) has been asked for through the MAB repeat MAB to be delivered between now and December 1942. I should be very grateful for your help in this matter which I regard as most important and urgent.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

_____M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Page #3 Number 78, May 12th, 1942. XXXC

in this country. Should this suggestion meet with your approval I need hardly say that we should be delighted to have your troops with us and they would be assured of a warm welcome from our own airborne forces which Marshall reviewed with me when he was over here.

Prime

Action Copy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

19 MAY 1942

Memorandum for Captain McCrea:

At 2210, Mr. Hopkins summoned me to the President's Study, where the President gave me the attached papers and directed me to make a smooth copy of the message to Mr. Churchill, and to send a smooth copy of the message to Mr. Curtin to the Australian Legation via the State Department.


I returned to the President at 2240 with the re-typed message to Mr. Churchill. This he signed after reading it with Mr. Hopkins, and I have filed it in the President-Prime Minister file. A carbon copy was delivered to a Code room messenger and has been sent as #147. The President directed that the other papers on this subject be given to you, saying "Captain McCrea will

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

know what to do with them." They are attached below.

I typed a smooth copy of the message to Prime Minister Curtin and gave it to Mr. Moreland, the State Department Watch Officer, who called for it in person at 2300. As per the President's instructions ~~instructions~~ transmitted by me, Mr. Moreland turned this over to a representative of the Australian Legation (Mr Hayden, the Second Secretary of the Legation, who called for the message at the State Department at 2350). The original and a copy as given to the State Department are attached.

Very respectfully,



G. M. Elsey
Chart Room Watch Officer

~~SECRET~~

May 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

There is forwarded herewith a copy of a despatch received from the Prime Minister this date.

It is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepare draft of reply for the President.

Very respectfully,

JOHN L. McCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

24215

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 5 1972

[REDACTED]
MAY 19, 1942

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: PRESIDENT

NO. _____

1. I HAVE BEEN GIVING A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT TO THE ALLOCATION OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURED HERE.

2. IT IS OUR CONSIDERED CONVICTION THAT ALL PLANES MAINTAINED IN A RESERVE STATUS ARE IN FACT IN AN INACTIVE STATUS IN REGARD TO THE PARAMOUNT OBJECTIVE OF MAXIMUM AND CONTINUOUS AIR IMPACT ON THE ENEMY.

3. I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND OUR GREAT DESIRE TO MAKE THE MOST EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO OUR COMBINED WAR EFFORT IN EVERY APPROPRIATE THEATER TO THE LIMIT OF OUR GROWING CAPACITY.

4. I AM CONFIDENT THAT OUR RESPECTIVE AIR FORCES CAN ADAPT THEMSELVES IN ESSENTIAL COOPERATION WITH OUR RESPECTIVE GROUND AND SEA FORCES WHENEVER AND WHEREVER THE COMMON CAUSE CAN BE ADVANCED.

5. IT IS EVIDENT THAT UNDER CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS WE ARE GOING TO HAVE INCREASING TRAINED AIR PERSONNEL IN EXCESS OF COMBAT PLANES IN SIGHT FOR THEM. WE ARE THEREFORE ANXIOUS THAT EVERY APPROPRIATE AMERICAN-MADE AIRCRAFT BE MANNED AND FOUGHT BY OUR OWN CREWS. EXISTING SCHEDULES OF AIRCRAFT ALLOCATION DO NOT PERMIT US TO DO THIS.

6. NOT ONLY ARE PRESENT CONDITIONS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE LEND-LEASE ARRANGEMENTS OF LAST YEAR BUT THEY ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE ARRIVED AT IN THE SO-CALLED

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. S. Stewart
Date OCT 12 1971

ARNOLD-PORTAL AGREEMENT OF THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING OUR ENTRY INTO THE WAR. ONE EXAMPLE OF THIS DIFFERENCE OF SITUATION IS THE CURRENT POSITION OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND NOW AND AS OF FIVE MONTHS AGO.


7. MY THOUGHT IS THAT THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, WITH YOUR APPROVAL AND MINE, WOULD DETERMINE THE STRENGTH OF AIRCRAFT TO BE MAINTAINED IN THE RESPECTIVE THEATERS OF WAR. I REPEAT OUR FIRM BELIEF THAT THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PLANES POSSIBLE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN COMBAT AND THE MINIMUM NUMBER CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY BE HELD IN RESERVE AND IN OPERATIONAL TRAINING UNITS.

8. I PROPOSE THAT ARNOLD AND TOWERS GO TO LONDON AT ONCE WITH EVILL TO MEET WITH PORTAL AND THE APPROPRIATE AIR OFFICER OF THE ADMIRALTY TO DISCUSS THE VERY IMPORTANT DETAILS IMPLIED IN THE BROAD POLICY EXPRESSED IN THIS MESSAGE. I WOULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT PORTAL RETURN HERE WITH ARNOLD EVILL AND TOWERS FOR THE FINAL DISCUSSION.

ROOSEVELT

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

URGENT

 May 20, 1942


8:50 P. M.

From London

To President of the United States

Copies furnished as noted:


No 80 May 20th, 1942.

Personal and  to President no 88. Your no 147.

We understand and respect the generous impulse which inspires the United States air force to engage American lives in the conflict at the earliest moment. God knows we have no right to claim undue priority in the ranks of honour. Let us each do our utmost. So may it be to the end.

The sole objective must be the maximum air impact on the enemy, month by month. We have both of us to find together the highest fulfilment of this irrespective of whether British or United States pilots man the aircraft.

For this purpose a common expansion plan is necessary, and a ruthless scrutiny of reserves, discrepancies or anything clogging the pipelines. Please send Arnold and Towers at the earliest possible moment. We shall lay everything before them. Portal will return with them and if necessary I will come myself.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date


Action Copy

MAY 5 1972

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks

To _____

Date MAY 5 1972

Copies furnished as noted:

Page 2. No 80 May 20, 1942 from London

I ought to tell you however that as we understand it, General Arnolds proposals for revision of the allocations of American aircraft to the Royal Air force mean the loss of nearly 5000 aeroplanes to us this year. The effect would be to reduce by over 100 squadrons (nearly 2000 first line aeroplanes) the force which we had planned to have in action by the spring of 1943. Dependent on your expected deliveries we have already taken into service and are now training pilots, crews and mechanics for this plan, and ancillary equipment of all kinds will be available for it. Indeed, we have in active theatres of War awaiting aeroplanes at this moment about 30 squadrons, some of them veteran units which have lost their equipment in action.

I hope Mr President you will not take any final decision without considering how these hundred squadrons are to be replaced by American units on the various battle fronts by the dates expected. Without your assurance on these points the whole structure of our plans would collapse, and an entirely new view of the War

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Page 3. No 80 May 20, 1942 from London

would have to be taken. Former Naval person

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

~~SECRET~~

Action Copy

19 May/42
5 P.M.

Dear Harry:

Herewith

- (1) marked-up copy of draft
despatch to the Prime
Minister re aircraft
- (2) draft of reply to Mr.
Curtin with paragraph
added as indicated by the
President - today

Remain cheerful!

King

1. I have been giving a great deal of thought to the allocation of combat aircraft manufactured here.

2. It is our considered conviction that all planes maintained in a reserve status are in fact in an inactive status in regard to the paramount objective of maximum and continuous air impact on the enemy.

3. I am sure you will understand our great desire to make the most effective contribution to our combined war effort in every appropriate theater to the limit of our growing capacity.

4. I am confident that our respective air forces can adapt themselves in essential cooperation with our respective ground and sea forces whenever and wherever the common cause can be advanced.

5. It is evident that under current arrangements we are going to have increasing trained air personnel in excess of combat planes in sight for them. We are therefore anxious that every appropriate American-made aircraft be manned and fought by our own crews. Existing schedules of aircraft allocation do not permit us to do this.

6. Not only are present conditions different from those existing at the time of the lend-lease arrangements of last year but they are different from those arrived at in the so-called Arnold Portal agreement of the days immediately following our entry into the war. One example of this difference of situation is the current position of Australia and New Zealand now and as of five months ago.

7. My thought is that the combined Chiefs of Staff, with your approval and mine, would determine the ~~number and type~~ of aircraft to be maintained in the respective theaters of war. I repeat our firm belief that the maximum number of planes possible should be maintained in combat and the minimum number held in reserve and in operational training units.

8. I ~~suggest~~ ^{propose} that Arnold and Towers go to London at once to meet with Portal and the appropriate air officer of the Admiralty to discuss the very important details implied in the broad policy expressed in this message. *I would also suggest that Portal return here with Arnold, Evill and Towers for the final discussion*

Strength

with

Evill

*Checked with Towers present
do with Marshall & Arnold via phone*

Consistent with security be

King

CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

May 27, 1942

12:42 P M.

From LONDON

To The President of the United States
The White House

Copies furnished as noted:

Number 81, May 27th, 1942. XXXC

Former Naval Person to President personal and

Number 89.

We have done very good work this and last week with Molotov and as Winant will no doubt have informed you we have completely transformed the treaty proposals. They are now in my judgment free from the objections we both entertained and are entirely compatible with our Atlantic Charter. The treaty was signed yesterday afternoon with great cordiality on both sides.

Molotov is a statesman and has a freedom of action very different from what you and I saw with Litvinov. I am very sure you will be able to reach good understandings with him. Please let me know your impressions.

So far all has gone well with the Northern Convoy but the dangers on the next 2 days must necessarily be serious.

I had an opening talk with Arnold and Towers and both are coming to me for the weekend. I am arranging for them to meet all our air chiefs and they will go into every detail together. I have hope that a good arrangement will be possible. The 2 principles seem to be (A) optimum impact on the enemy and (B) maximum American contribution thereto.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Number 81, May 27th, 1942. XXXC

Mountbatten and Lyttelton will come together but formers visit must be short on account of our common work with which he is charged.

I am fully aware of your preoccupations in the Pacific at the present time and if you considered it necessary to withdraw Washington at once we should quite understand. It is however most important to complete our concentration in the Indian Ocean of Warspite, Valiant, Nelson and Rodney by the middle of July. This can be done if we can retain Washington until King George V finishes refitting at the end of June.

The introduction of convoys between Key West and Hampton roads has evidently had the good effect we all expected, but the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico are still very sore spots. King and Pound have been in communication about this and I hope it may be found possible, even by running risks elsewhere, to provide sufficient escort craft to deal with these areas.

I must express my gratitude for your allocation of 70 tankers to build up United Kingdom stocks of oil. Without this help our stocks would have fallen to a dangerous level by the end of the year. This action is the more generous considering recent heavy American tanker losses and the sacrifices involved in re-

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED BY British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

_____M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Number 81, May 27th, 1942. XXXC

leasing so many ships.

PRIME

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

Confidential
Credits now vs last Oct. - 14

vs time of Arnold-Portal agreement

I HAVE BEEN GIVING A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT TO THE ALLOCATION OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES.

IT IS EVIDENT THAT UNDER PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TRAINED AIR PERSONNEL IN EXCESS OF COMBAT PLANES AVAILABLE TO THEM. ~~FURTHERMORE WE HAVE MEANS OF TRANSPORTING THESE AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL TO COMBAT THEATERS.~~ AS YOU KNOW, WE WANT TO GET INTO THIS WAR IN EVERY APPROPRIATE THEATER TO THE LIMIT OF OUR MANPOWER.

IF IN SO FAR AS THE AIR IS CONCERNED, THEREFORE, WE ARE ANXIOUS THAT EVERY APPROPRIATE AMERICAN-MADE COMBAT AIRCRAFT BE FOUGHT BY OUR OWN CREWS TO A FAR GREATER EXTENT THAN IS NOW POSSIBLE UNDER EXISTING SCHEDULES OF ALLOCATIONS. ~~DO NOT PERMIT US TO DO THIS.~~ EXISTING ALLOCATIONS.

I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND NOT ONLY THE NECESSITY FOR THIS BUT OUR GREAT ANXIETY TO MAKE THE MOST EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO OUR JOINT WAR EFFORT.

I AM SURE THAT OUR RESPECTIVE AIR FORCES CAN ADAPT THEMSELVES TO COOPERATE ~~FROM A TACTICAL POINT OF VIEW~~ WITH OUR RESPECTIVE GROUND AND SEA FORCES WHEREVER THAT MAY BE NECESSARY. THE ONLY THEATER WHICH AT THE MOMENT I EXCLUDE FROM AMERICAN PERSONNEL IS THE RUSSIAN THEATER, WHICH, FOR REASONS PARTICULARLY OF LANGUAGE, WOULD MAKE DIRECT OPERATION DIFFICULT. EVEN IN THIS THEATER I CAN VISUALIZE CERTAIN TYPES OF AIR FORCE, PARTICULARLY THE BIG BOMBERS, OPERATING.

I REALIZE FULLY THAT WHAT I AM SAYING TO YOU MEANS THAT YOUR OWN AIR FORCE WILL NOT INCREASE AS RAPIDLY AS HAS BEEN

It is our firm conviction that the number of planes maintained in a reserve status is uneconomical to our common effort and, consequently, that we must be ~~should be made to~~ reduced to a minimum. ~~the number~~

and so increase the number of planes that are ~~in reserve~~ and merely standing by as ~~confused~~ ~~operating~~ status. ~~that~~ ~~are in combat~~ ~~status~~ ~~the enemy~~ ~~is greater~~ ~~in part on the enemy~~

1. I have been giving a great deal of thought to the allocation of combat aircraft manufactured here.
2. It is our considered conviction that all planes maintained in a reserve status are in fact in an inactive status in regard to the paramount objective of maximum and continuous air impact on the enemy.
3. I am sure you will understand our great desire to make the most effective contribution to our combined war effort in every appropriate theater to the limit of our growing capacity.
4. I am confident that our respective air forces can adapt themselves in essential cooperation with our respective ground and sea forces whenever and wherever the common cause can be advanced.
5. It is evident that under current arrangements we are going to have increasing trained air personnel in excess of combat planes in sight for them. We are therefore anxious that every appropriate American-made aircraft be manned and fought by our own crews. Existing schedules of aircraft allocation do not permit us to do this.
6. Not only are present conditions different from those existing at the time of the lend-lease arrangements of last year but they are different from those arrived at in the so-called Arnold Portal agreement of the days immediately following our entry into the war. One example of this difference of situation is the current position of Australia and New Zealand now and as of five months ago.
7. My thought is that the combined Chiefs of Staff, with your approval and mine, would determine the number and type of aircraft to be maintained in the respective theaters of war. I repeat our firm belief that the maximum number of planes possible should be maintained in combat and the minimum number held in reserve and in operational training units.
8. I suggest that Arnold and Towers go to London at once to meet with Portal and the appropriate air officer of the Admiralty to discuss the very important details implied in the broad policy expressed in this message.

I HAVE BEEN GIVING A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT TO THE ALLOCATION OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES.

IT IS EVIDENT THAT UNDER PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TRAINED AIR PERSONNEL IN EXCESS OF COMBAT PLANES AVAILABLE TO THEM. FURTHERMORE WE HAVE MEANS OF TRANSPORTING THESE AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL TO COMBAT THEATERS. AS YOU KNOW, WE WANT TO GET INTO THIS WAR IN EVERY APPROPRIATE THEATER TO THE LIMIT OF OUR MANPOWER.

IN SO FAR AS THE AIR IS CONCERNED, THEREFORE, WE ARE ANXIOUS THAT EVERY APPROPRIATE AMERICAN-MADE COMBAT AIRCRAFT BE FOUGHT BY OUR OWN CREWS TO A FAR GREATER EXTENT THAN IS NOW POSSIBLE UNDER EXISTING ALLOCATIONS. I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND NOT ONLY THE NECESSITY FOR THIS BUT OUR GREAT ANXIETY TO MAKE THE MOST EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO OUR JOINT WAR EFFORT.

I AM SURE THAT OUR RESPECTIVE AIR FORCES CAN ADAPT THEMSELVES TO COOPERATE FROM A TACTICAL POINT OF VIEW WITH OUR RESPECTIVE GROUND AND SEA FORCES WHEREVER THAT MAY BE NECESSARY. THE ONLY THEATER WHICH AT THE MOMENT I EXCLUDE FROM AMERICAN PERSONNEL IS THE RUSSIAN THEATER, WHICH, FOR REASONS PARTICULARLY OF LANGUAGE, WOULD MAKE DIRECT OPERATION DIFFICULT. EVEN IN THIS THEATER I CAN VISUALIZE CERTAIN TYPES OF AIR FORCE, PARTICULARLY THE BIG BOMBERS, OPERATING.

I REALIZE FULLY THAT WHAT I AM SAYING TO YOU MEANS THAT YOUR OWN AIR FORCE WILL NOT INCREASE AS RAPIDLY AS HAS BEEN

*Personnel allocated
made by way of
of the war.*

*will mean a greater
percentage of total planes
in combat*

PLANNED BUT ON THE OTHER HAND IT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THERE WILL BE FEWER COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN ANY THEATER OF THE WAR. IT MERELY MEANS THAT MORE OF THEM WILL BE FOUGHT BY OUR OWN PERSONNEL.

THERE ARE, OF COURSE, CERTAIN LIMITATIONS TO THIS PROPOSAL, SUCH AS YOUR REQUIREMENTS FOR OUR PRODUCTION OF MARTIN LIGHT BOMBERS AND PARTICULARLY FOR PLANES TO YOUR AIR FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, PENDING SUCH TIME AS A DECISION IS REACHED AS TO WHETHER OUR OWN AIR FORCE WILL JOIN WITH YOU IN THAT THEATER. IN ANY COMBAT THEATER WHERE IT SEEMS UNWISE FOR OUR OWN PERSONNEL TO OPERATE, THEN, OF COURSE, AMERICAN-BUILT AIRPLANES WILL BE SENT AS DETERMINED BY THE STRATEGIC NECESSITIES.

MY THOUGHT IS THAT THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, WITH YOUR APPROVAL AND MINE, WOULD DETERMINE THE NUMBER AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT TO BE MAINTAINED IN THE RESPECTIVE THEATERS OF WAR. I BELIEVE THAT THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PLANES POSSIBLE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN COMBAT AND THE MINIMUM NUMBER HELD IN RESERVE AND IN OPERATIONAL TRAINING UNITS.

I SUGGEST THAT ARNOLD AND TOWERS GO TO LONDON AT ONCE TO MEET WITH PORTAL AND THE APPROPRIATE AIR OFFICER OF THE ADMIRALTY TO DISCUSS THE VERY IMPORTANT DETAILS IMPLIED IN THIS MESSAGE BUT THE BROAD POLICY WHICH IS EXPRESSED IN THIS MESSAGE SHOULD NOT BE REFERRED TO THEM.

AMDI 9
27/955p
dp

~~SECRET~~
Radiogram

CSWD

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

May 27, 1942

4:02 P. M.

From Prime

To The President of the United States

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 82, May 27, 1942

To President No. 90. I am venturing to send you a collection of the books I have written, which I have had bound up, hoping you will find a place for them in your shelves. Kindest good wishes.
Former Naval Person.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

AHC

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London

Dated May 28, 1942

Rec'd 4:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

2966, May 28, 4 a.m.

Embassy's 2943, May 27, 11 a.m.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

~~REDACTED~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL
PERSON.

"No. 91. Your 149.

One. I send in my immediate following report of our formal conversation, which covers Bolero, Sledgehammer and Super-Round-Up.

Additional private conversation improved atmosphere but did not alter substance. We made great progress in intimacy and goodwill.

Two. We are working hard with your officers and all preparations are proceeding ceaselessly on the largest scale. Dickie will explain to you the difficulties of 1942 when he arrives. I have also told the Staffs to study a landing in the north of Norway, the occupation of which seems necessary to ensure the flow of our supplies next year to Russia. I have told Molotov we would have something ready for him about this

-2- #2966, May 28, 4 a.m., from London

him about this to discuss on his return here. We did not go deeply into it in any way. Personally, I set great importance upon it if a good plan can be made.

Three. So far our northern convoy is fighting its way through having lost five ships, sunk or turned back, out of 35. Tomorrow, 28th, we ought to be getting under the Russian air umbrella if any has been provided. Otherwise, two more days of this.

Four. Auchinleck's news tonight indicates that the battle in Libya has begun. This may be the biggest encounter we have ever fought. General Smuts who has visited the whole front expresses high confidence in the result. I am sure all American hearts will be with us. The issue seems to depend on the armoured fighting on the desert flank. Personally I welcome the trial of strength and am glad if it has come about by Rommel's attack.

Five. We must never let gymnast pass from our minds. All other preparations would help if need be towards that.

WINANT

ALC

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972


WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS: - (The White House)

Subject: Principles which should cover
the reallocation of combat
planes produced in the U.S.

Herewith copies of suggested general principles covering the reallocation of combat planes produced in the United States. Your attention is invited to the fact that they are being revised in the General Staff, and that both of the attached are first drafts subject to criticism, revision, and correction.


H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Incl: Drafts of 2 memos
re above subj.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- OCT 12 1971

Signature- 

May 18, 1942

Subject: Principles which should cover the reallocation of combat planes produced in the United States.

1. The strength and disposition of combat units of the Allied Air Forces to meet the strategic requirements will be as determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
2. The United States will build up and maintain Air Forces of the size necessary to meet our war and post-war requirements.
3. In general combat planes produced in the United States will be flown by personnel of our own armed forces. Certain exceptions are listed hereafter.
4. Types, non-standard for the United States Army or Navy being produced for other Allied Nations will be continued in production and the supply of these types will be maintained as long as necessary to maintain the combined allied aerial strength.
5. Reallocations made will insure that the Air Forces in the various theatres will not be reduced below the Combined Chiefs of Staff requirements.
6. In general, United States produced airplanes will not be supplied to other Nations as long as United States pilots or combat crews are on the ground awaiting planes.
7. The maximum possible number of planes will be maintained in combat against our enemies. Those in transit, held in reserve or used in operational training units, will be held to a minimum.
8. In theatres where facilities and arrangements have been made for maintaining and repairing our planes or where our planes are now used by combat units, the United States will continue to supply planes or may replace and/or supplement units of our allies whichever means appears to be most effective in maintaining the maximum aerial striking force.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- OCT 12 1971

Signature- *RHPR*

[REDACTED]

PRINCIPLES TO COVER THE REALLOCATION OF AMERICAN COMBAT AIRPLANES.

1. The strategic disposition of units in combat of the allied Air Force will be determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
2.
 - a. The entire allied air effort is necessary to defeat the Axis.
 - b. The American component of the allied air effort shall consist of American Forces manned, equipped and operated by Americans.
3. The strength of the American and British components of the Allied Air Forces will be, in general, proportionate to the resources of the two nations.
 - a. Each nation will determine the strength of its own component based on its own resources.
 - b. Where American facilities to train or to equip combat units exceed American requirements, excess facilities may be made available to the Allies.
4. All details as to operations or reserve and supply will be designed to provide Air Forces of the size required for the eventual defeat of the Axis. Interim combat requirements will be permitted to delay in the development of the eventual Air Force only to the extent necessary to stave off defeat.
5. In order to build an American Air Force it is necessary, in general, that all combat airplanes manufactured in the United States be flown by personnel from the American Armed Forces except when types non-standard for the United States Army or Navy are produced for other allied nations, such production will be continued, provided.
 - a. That such non-standard airplanes are not required to equip trained U. S. combat crews which are on the ground awaiting planes.
 - b. That such manufacturing capacity is not required for the production of standard American types.
6. The maximum number of planes will be maintained in combat.
7. The minimum number of combat aircraft will be held in reserve and in operational training units.
8. The United States agrees to undertake the repair and technical supply of all American aircraft operated in active theaters.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- OCT 12 1961

Signature- *RAH*

[REDACTED]

LCR
Filed 510A/28
ame

CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

May 28, 1942

7:25 A M.

From LCR LONDON

To POTUS

Copies furnished as noted:

No. HR 1

Former Naval Person to President number 92 following is report referred to in my number 91 begins "May 22 11 AM Operations on the Continent 1942-43.

Mr. Churchill welcoming Molotov and his advisers, said that he understood that Molotov was anxious to place before the British Government the views held by the Soviet Government on the subject of an invasion of the Continent.

Molotov said that he had been charged by the Soviet Government to come to London to discuss the question of the establishment of a "Second Front."

This was no new problem. It had first been raised nearly ten months ago and now, more recently, the impetus had come from President Roosevelt, who had suggested to Mr Stalin that he (Molotov) should go to the United States to discuss this question. Although, therefore, the initiative for the present enquirey had come from the United States, the Soviet Government had thought it right that he should proceed to the United States via London, since it was upon Great Britain that the main task for organizing the Second Front would initially fall.

Speaking generally, Molotov said that the Soviet Government considered this to be a most urgent and pressing problem, in which both Great Britain and Russia were vitally concerned. It was indeed a matter for discussion with complete frankness, as becoming conversations between allies. On the Russian front, operations of the greatest intensity and importance were now impending and the weeks and months which lay immediately

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

Action Copy

MAY 5 1972

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~ M.

From

To Potus

Copies furnished as noted:

No. HR 1

Page 2

ahead were fraught with the most serious consequences to the Soviet Union and their allies. During last winter, the Soviet army had got the batter of Hitler's army, and had immediately set about preparing for the campaign of 1942. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government contemplated a fierce and bitter struggle in which the Germans would not yield easily or quickly. In this battle, the main weight would fall upon the Soviet army. They were proud of this honor. On both sides, immense forces, backed by mighty armaments, were ranged against each other. The material aid rendered by Great Britain and the United States was highly prized and appreciated by the Soviet Government. Nevertheless, the most urgent issues were involved in the establishment of a "Second Front".

The object of his (Molotov's) visit was to learn how the British Government viewed the prospects of drawing off some of the weight from Russia, where it seemed that, at the present time, the balance of advantage in armed strength lay with the Germans. It should be remembered that Hitler could call upon vast resources seized from the subjugated and enslaved peoples scattered over a large part of Europe.

In concrete terms, the proposal he had to make was that Russia's allies, and Great Britain in the first place, should aim at containing forty enemy divisions in western Europe. If this could be done, the doom of Hitler was sealed, if not in 1942, at any rate very soon afterwards.

Mr Churchill said that, in all previous wars, control of the sea had given the power possessing it the great advantage of being able to land, at will, on the enemy's coast, since it was impossible for the enemy to be prepared at every point to meet

~~SECRET~~
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
R. H. Parks Date

Action Copy

MAY 5 1972

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~ M.

From _____

To _____ Potus

Copies furnished as noted:

No. HR 1

Page 3

seaborne invasion. The advent of air power had altered the whole situation. For example, in France and the low countries the enemy could move his air forces in a few hours to threatened points anywhere along the coast; and bitter experience had shown that landing, in the teeth of enemy air opposition, was not a sound military proposition. The inescapable consequence was that large portions of the Continental coastline were denied to us as places for disembarkation. We were forced, therefore, to study our chances at those parts of the coast where our superior fighter force would give us control in the air. Our choice was, in fact, narrowed down to the Pas de Calais, the Cherbourg "Tipe" and part of the Brest area. The problem of landing a force this year in one or more of these areas was being studied, and preparations were being made, with the utmost energy. Our plans were being based on the assumption that the landing of successive waves of assault troops would bring about air battles which, if continued over a week or ten days, would lead to the virtual destruction of the enemy's air power on the continent. Once this was achieved and the air opposition removed, landings at other points on the coast could be effected under cover of our superior seapower. The crucial point in making our plans and preparations was the availability of the special landing craft required for effecting the initial landing on the very heavily defended enemy coastline. Unfortunately, our resources in this special type of craft were, for the time being, strictly limited. As far back as last August, at the Atlantic meeting, he (Mr Churchill) had impressed upon President Roosevelt the urgent need for the United States to build as large a number of tank landing and other assault craft as possible. Later, in January of this year, the President had agreed that the United States should make an even larger effort to construct these craft. We, for our part, for more than a year, had

Action Copy

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-
By R. H. Parks Date _____

MAY 5 1972

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To Potus _____

Copies furnished as noted:

No. HR 1

Page 4

been turning out as large a number of assault craft as our need for constructing ships for the Navy and mercantile marine, which had suffered greivous losses, permittter

In April, President Roosevelt had sent Mr Hopkins and General Marshall to London with the proposal that the United States should join with Great Britain, at the earliest date, in taking the greatest possible weight off Russia. We had immediately agreed to this proposal, and joint studies were proceeding apace. It could not be expected, however, that United States forces would be available till very late in 1942, or that the landing craft we so urgently required would be available in large numbers this year. By first August we should have only 383 landing: By first Sept 566. In 1943, very much larger numbers would be available, and we could descend on the enemy coast at five or six points, anywhere between the North Cape and Bayonne. It was, however, the earnest resolve of the British Government to see what could be done this year to give the much needed support to the valiant Russian armies, who were confronting so large a part of Germany's military might, and had already inflicted such deep wounds upon it.

Two points should, however, be borne in mind. First, with the best will and endeavor, it was unlikely that any

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel. 2-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 3 1972

~~SECRET~~

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____ Potus

Copies furnished as noted:

No. HR 1

Page 5.

move we could make in 1942, even if it were successful, would draw off large numbers of enemy land forces from the Eastern front. In the air, however, the position was different; in the various theaters of war we were already containing about one half of the fighter and one third of the German bomber strength. If our plan for forcing air battles over the continent proved successful, the Germans might be faced with the choice either of seeing the whole of their fighter air force in the west destroyed, or of making withdrawals from their air strength in the east.

The second point related to Molotov's proposition that our aim should be to draw off (including those now in the west) not less than forty German divisions from Russia. It should be noted that, at the present time, we had confronting us in Libya eleven Axis divisions, of which three were German, the equivalent of eight German divisions in Norway, and 25 German divisions in France and the Low Countries. These totalled 44 divisions.

But we were not satisfied with that, and if any further effort could be made or plan devised, provided it was sound and sensible, for drawing the weight off Russia this year, we should not hesitate to put it into effect. Clearly, it would not further either the Russian cause or that of the Allies as a whole if, for the sake of action at any price, we embarked on some operation which ended in disaster and gave the enemy an opportunity for glorification at our discomfiture. Thus to sum up, we and the United States would do everything that was physically possible to meet the wishes of the Russian Government and nation in this matter.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____ Potus _____

Copies furnished as noted:

No. HR 1

Page 6.

M. Molotov enquired whether the views expressed by Mr. Churchill were shared by the United States Government on the subject of the second front.

Mr. Churchill said that the United States Government shared to the full our resolve to operate on the continent with the largest possible forces at the earliest possible moment. This was their ardent desire, and in 1943 our joint plans contemplated the landing of a force of up to one and a half million United States-British troops on the continent.

The United States were anxious to take their share in any operations carried out this year, but their contribution in the near future would not be on any considerable scale. As an earnest of their intent, we had with us now in London a number of American officers who were collaborating closely with our staffs in the preparation of plans; and more were on their way.

M. Molotov then asked whether it was possible and appropriate to make an estimate of the percentage of British troops, including those on all fronts, employed on active operations against the enemy, at any given date during the last three months.

Mr. Churchill said that the proportion of British troops on all fronts actually at grips with the enemy was naturally small. He went on to explain in general terms the dispositions of our forces; up to 53,000 men a month were leaving our shores for the middle and Far East theaters.

M. Molotov said that he had no doubt that Great Britain genuinely wished for the success of the

~~SECRET~~

Action Copy

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____ Potus

Copies furnished as noted:

No. HR 1.

Page 7.

Soviet Army against the Germans this summer. What, in the view of the British Government, were the prospects of Soviet success? Whatever their views might be he would be glad to have a frank expression of opinion - good or bad.

Mr. Churchill said that, without detailed knowledge of the resources and reserves on both sides, it was difficult to form a firm judgment on this question. Last year the military experts, including those of Germany, had thought that the Soviet Army might be borne down and overcome. They had proved quite wrong. In the event the Soviet forces had defeated Hitler and nearly brought his Army to disaster. Consequently Russia's allies felt great confidence in the strength and ability of the Soviet Army.

The intelligence available to the British Government did not indicate the massing of vast German forces at any particular point on the eastern front. Moreover, the full scale offensive heralded for May now seemed unlikely to take place before June. In any event, it did not seem that Hitler's attack this year could be as strong or so menacing as that of 1941. In making this statement he (Mr. Churchill) did not wish it to be inferred that we were asking our guests for information which they might be reluctant to disclose.

M. Molotov, in reply, agreed that nobody could be expected to make accurate prophecies about the future.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

~~SECRET~~

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____ Potus _____

Copies furnished as noted:

No. HR 1.

Page 8.

The great Russian country and people believed in their own strength, but they also believed in facing up to the worst possibilities. Supposing the Soviet Army failed to hold out against the maximum effort which Hitler would undoubtedly exert during 1942, how would the British Government view the position in which they would be placed.

Mr. Churchill said that if the Russians were defeated or the Soviet military power was seriously reduced by the German onslaught, Hitler would, in all probability, move as many troops and air forces as possible back to the west, with the object of invading Great Britain. He might also strike down through Baku to the Caucasus and Persia. This would expose us to the gravest dangers and we should by no means feel satisfied that we had sufficient forces to ward off the latter thrust. Therefore, our fortunes were bound up with the resistance of the Soviet Army. Nevertheless, if contrary to expectation, they were defeated, and the worst came to the worst, we should fight on, and with the help of the United States, hope to build up overwhelming air superiority, which, in the course of the next eighteen months or two years would enable us to put down a devastating weight of air attack on the German cities and industries. We should, moreover, maintain the blockade and make landings on the continent against an increasingly enfeebled opposition. Ultimately, the power of Great Britain and the United States would prevail. It should not be overlooked that after the fall of France Great Britain had stood alone for a whole year with but a handful of ill equipped troops between her and Hitler's victorious and numerous divisions.

~~SECRET~~

Action Copy

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

~~SECRET~~
M.

From _____

To Potus _____

Copies furnished as noted:

No. HR 1.

Page 9.

But what a tragedy for mankind would be this prolongation of the war, and how earnest was the hope for Russian victory and how ardent the desire that we should take our share in conquering the evil foe. He, Mr. Churchill, wished M. Molotov to realize that it was the dearest wish of the British nation and Army to come to grips with the enemy at the earliest moment and so to aid the gallant fight of the Russian Army and people.

In conclusion, Mr. Churchill asked M. Molotov to bear in mind the difficulty of oversea invasions. After France fell out of the war, we in Great Britain were almost naked, a few ill equipped divisions, less than 100 tanks and less than 200 field guns. And yet Hitler had not attempted an invasion, by reason of the fact that he could not get command of the air. The same sort of difficulties confronted us at the present time. He suggested that General Isayev and Admiral Kharlamov should meet Lt. General Nyo and Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten that afternoon, in order that they might be told the exact position as regards the special landing craft necessary for overseas operations.

M. Molotov agreed. He thanked Mr. Churchill for what he had said. He would carefully report to his Government. In conclusion, he would like to say that the Russian people also believed in their strength and in the strength of their Allies.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

~~SECRET~~
MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

May 16, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Aircraft situation in the United Nations.

1. The Army Air Forces cannot be equipped, trained and maintained during the remainder of 1942, nor can air forces be provided for both the initiation of an offensive in Europe and a strategic defensive in the Pacific, under the aircraft allocations provided by the Arnold-Portal Agreement. An immediate reallocation is necessary.

2. The situation under which the Arnold-Portal agreement was reached has greatly altered. The strategical situation and the United States commitments in the Pacific Theatre have not only changed materially, but until very recently the War Department did not have detailed information on British production, allocations and reserves. Furthermore, we were unaware of the British basis of calculation on reserves and attrition, which we now learn exceed our basis for calculating such requirements by an average of approximately 100 per cent.

3. The conception of the United States as the Arsenal of the Democracies had two purposes:

a. The initial provision of essential materials of war for the nations opposing the Axis.

b. The creation of a war potential which, if the United States entered the war, could and would be retained for the creation of necessary American armed forces. The United States is now at war. It requires the aircraft production that it has created. (bure)

4. In order to correct the situation outlined above, it is recommended that the present schedule of deliveries from United States production for all types of combat airplanes to Great Britain, be amended as follows:

Army Types

June 1942 - 50% of each type, except Martin 187 (light bombers), be reallocated to the United States.

July 1942 - 75% of each type, except Martin 187 (light bombers), be reallocated to the United States.



DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ORDER SEC

ARMY BY TAG PER 720314

By Red/PKs Date MAY 1 1972

[REDACTED]

August 1942 - thereafter 100% of each type, be reallocated to the United States; provided further:

That the entire United States production of Martin 187 (light bombers), remain allocated to Great Britain, and

That the eleven American equipped pursuit squadrons in the Middle East on April 1, 1942 be furnished 20% monthly attrition replacements on initial equipment.

That the United States fulfill its present aircraft commitments to Russia (protocol to June 30, 1942; deliveries to be completed about August 15); that thereafter the allotments to Russia will be determined by the rate of attrition being suffered in the British-American air offensive over the European Continent, provided that a monthly average minimum of 50 United States pursuit, 50 light and 12 medium bombers will be guaranteed by the United States. It will also be understood that the British allocation to Russia will be maintained in general accordance with the foregoing policy, and that the United States will make no objection to the allocation by Russia of United States planes to Great Britain on a trade basis, to effect a better standardization of types or to facilitate transfers.

That both Great Britain and the United States be responsible for the equipment and replacements for their own combat units, except in the Pacific theatre where the United States agrees to maintain and repair existing British Commonwealth units now equipped with American aircraft, and except in the Middle East as provided above.

That the allocation of aircraft to other nations be kept to the absolute minimum in order to concentrate adequate forces in the decisive theatres.

Navy Types

(The following is included with the concurrence of Admiral King.)

June through December 31, 1942 - 33 % of all flying boats be reallocated to the United States.

June through December 31, 1942 - 100% of all torpedo bombers be reallocated to the United States.

5. This recommended reallocation will:

Permit by January 1, 1943, the British program to be met to the extent of 81% of total aircraft requirements, and the United States program by 54% (The Target programs of both nations up to January 1, 1943 are approximately the same).

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ORDER SEC

ARMY BY TAG PER 720314

By PHAR Date MAY 1 1972

[REDACTED]

Permit the building of essential United States Air Forces and would still permit a thirty-four per cent expansion for the Royal Air Force by January 1, 1943.

Permit increased efficiency and simplicity, since each Nation will utilize its own aircraft.

Permit the great combat crew resources and training capabilities of the United States to be fully employed.

Enable American Air Forces to meet their combat and training requirements.


Result in the early provision of the required combined offensive air forces in the vital theater.

Enable Great Britain to maintain present United States equipped units in the Middle East with 150% reserve, and provide attrition replacements.

Enable a larger number of combat units to be employed offensively. The American policy of maintaining more moderate reserves will result in submitting the bulk of American aircraft to combat units.

I recommend that this subject be discussed with you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - on Monday, May 18th, if practicable.

Concur:
E. J. King
Chief of Naval Operations



Chief of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of ORDER SEC

ARMY BY TAG PER 720314

By RH/RS Date MAY 1 1972

 May 26, 1942.

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON (AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON)
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

NO. 148


I BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE TO HAVE MOUNTBATTEN COME FOR A
SHORT VISIT IF HE CAN BE SPARED.

I AM HAVING YOUR NASSAU FRIENDS TO LUNCH NEXT MONDAY.

LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING LYTTTELTON. ALL WELL HERE.
TAKE CARE OF YOURSELF.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1920, EWT, May 26, 1942.


JOHN L. MCCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Aide.

(Original copy, which had been added to in the President's handwriting,
delivered to Miss Tully this date 5-27-42 - F. J. T.)

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date OCT 12 1971

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
May 26, 1942.

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON (AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON)

FROM: PRESIDENT

NO. 148

I BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE TO HAVE MOUNTBATTEN COME FOR A
SHORT VISIT IF HE CAN BE SPARED.

I AM HAVING YOUR NASSAU FRIENDS TO LUNCH NEXT MONDAY.

LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING LYTTTELTON. *All will here.*

Take care of yourself.

Roosevelt

Released at 1920 EWT, May 26, 1942.

V. L. McCrea
JOHN L. MCCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *W. S. Stewart*
Date *OCT 12 1971*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Former Naval Person

We are expecting the
visitor tonight ~~at~~ but
will not discuss ~~the~~

Balero until Thursday.

Can you let me have
quickly a short summary
of ~~the~~ what you and Mr
Raid discussed about
Balero. It would
help me to know

Percival

SECRET

May 27, 1942

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

NO. 149

WE ARE EXPECTING THE VISITOR TONIGHT BUT WILL NOT
DISCUSS BOLERO UNTIL THURSDAY. CAN YOU LET ME HAVE QUICKLY
A SHORT SUMMARY OF WHAT YOU AND HE SAID TO EACH OTHER ABOUT
BOLERO. IT WOULD HELP ME TO KNOW.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1425, EWT, May 27, 1942.


Chester Hammond
Major, J.A.G.D.
White House Map Room

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.S. Stewart
Date OCT 12 1971

(Original copy, in the Presidents handwriting, delivered to
Miss Tully this date, 5-27-42, by Ensign Coffee. -ame)

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 27, 1942.

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

No. 150.

I AM INCLINED TO FAVOR THE IDEA OF INVITING GENERAL SMUTS TO COME TO WASHINGTON TO SEE ME AND STAY FOR A FEW DAYS, MORE IN A PERSONAL THAN IN A FORMAL CAPACITY. I HAVE KNOWN HIM EVER SINCE 1918 AND CORRESPOND WITH HIM OCCASIONALLY. ALSO I THINK IT MAY BE OF HELP TO HIM IN HIS HOME PROBLEMS TO GET A PICTURE OF THE GENERAL SITUATION FROM A FELLOW DUTCHMAN LIKE ME. I WOULD NOT SET ANY ESPECIAL DATE BUT MERELY SUGGEST SOME TIME THIS SUMMER. PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHAT YOU THINK.

I ALSO HAVE AN IDEA THAT IF I WERE TO INVITE OUR FRIEND JOHN CURTIN TO COME HERE FOR A VERY SHORT VISIT, BUT AT A DIFFERENT TIME FROM SMUTS' VISIT, IT MIGHT DO MUCH GOOD IN A WHOLLY DIFFERENT WAY. FROM ALL I HEAR HE IS A THOROUGHLY HONEST AND SINCERE PERSON BUT HAS HAD LITTLE OPPORTUNITY TO APPRECIATE THE WORLD SITUATION OUTSIDE OF HIS OWN SPHERE. THERE ARE ALSO MATTERS REGARDING COMMAND AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC IN WHICH I SHOULD LIKE TO TRY MY HAND AT INDOCTRINATION. (See #151)

I WISH YOU WOULD LET ME HAVE YOUR PERSONAL THOUGHT ON THIS MATTER ALSO.

Roosevelt
ROOSEVELT

Released at 2200, May 27, '42

Enc. E. Carson Watch Officer

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

May 28, 1942

4:23 P. M.

From LONDON

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Copies furnished as noted:

Number 93, May 28, 1942

Former Naval Person to President.

Personal and No. 93. Your 150. I can see nothing but good in either or both of the visits you mention. General Smuts may be coming here in the near future and a good opportunity would arise then. Shall I mention your idea to him as an additional incentive? We have been good friends for nearly forty years and I regard him as one of the greatest living men. As to Curtin, a visit could do nothing but good. I have got on very well with Evatt.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

3 LCR
Filed 1130P/28
DEG

~~SECRET~~
CABLEGRAM

CSWD

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

May 28, 1942

5:30 P. M.

From London

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Copies furnished as noted:

Number 94, May 28, 1942

From former Naval person. No. 94 Your 151.
I quite agree.

PRIME

TEXT OF 151:


"I would suggest to Curtin that he should not come here
until Evatt has returned to Australia " (Sent as 151
supplementing 150)

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

 May 28, 1942.


FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON, FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON

NO. 151 P R I O R I T Y

ADD TO SECOND PARAGRAPH OF MY NUMBER 150 QUOTE I WOULD
SUGGEST TO CURTIN THAT HE SHOULD NOT COME HERE UNTIL EVATT HAS
RETURNED TO AUSTRALIA UNQUOTE

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1140, EWT, May 28, 1942.


JOHN L. McCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy
Aide

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.S. Stewart
Date OCT 12 1971

From: The President

31 May 1942

TO: FORMER NAVY L. PERSON

ho 152

1. I am thrilled at the thought of the books and shall always cherish them.

2. I have sent the invitations to Smuts and Curtin, the latter not expected until after he has seen Evatt.

3. Molotov's visit is, I think, a real success because we have got on a personal footing of candor and as good a friendship as can be acquired through an interpreter. His departure will be delayed two or three days more.

4. He has made very clear his real anxiety as to the next four or five months, and I think this is sincere and not put forward to force our hand. I have a very strong feeling that the Russian position is precarious and may grow steadily worse during the coming weeks.

5. Therefore, I am more than ever anxious that Bolero proceed to definite action beginning in 1942. We all realize that because of weather conditions the operation cannot be delayed until the end of the year.

6. After talking with our Staff, I believe German Air Forces cannot be defeated or indeed brought to battle to an extent which will bring them off the Russian front until we have made a landing. I have great confidence in the ability of our joint airforces to gain complete control of the channel and enough of the land for appropriate bridge heads to be covered. This will result in either:

(a) Pulling German Air Forces away from the Russian front, with effort to destroy it on our part, or

(b) If German Air Force fails to come out, the ground troop operation can be increased with objective of establishing permanent positions.

7. United Staffs are now working on proposal to increase shipping for use in Bolero by cutting out a large portion of materials for Russia, other than munitions which can be used in battle this year. This ought ~~to~~ not to diminish supplies of munitions like planes, tanks, guns, ammunition, which Russians could use in combat this Summer. I think we can cut further on Murmansk-Archangel convoys and send more ready to use munitions via Basra. This should make your Home Fleet task easier, particularly destroyers.

8. I will telegraph you when Molotov leaves, and I am especially anxious that he carry back some real results of his Mission and that he will give a favorable account to Stalin. I am inclined to think that at present all the Russians are a bit down in the mouth.

But the important thing is that we may be and probably are faced with real trouble on the Russian front and must make our plans to meet it.

Roosevelt

5/31/42

Released at 1915
J. L. McCue
Captain USN
dide

1 LCR
655P/30
dj

CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

May 30, 1942

~~SECRET~~

~~225P~~ M.

From London

To The President of the United States

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 95. May 30, 1942

From former Naval person to President Roosevelt
personal and ~~secret~~.

Evatt is leaving quite soon for your side. He has
shown himself most friendly especially to me personally,
and I think you will find that he will help in every way.
It will be necessary for Evatt to get back to Australia
before Curtains visit.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

~~SECRET~~

Action Copy

1 LCR 197
443P/1 June
dj

CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

June 1, 1942

1110A M.

From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 96 June 1, 1942

Former Naval person to President Roosevelt
personal and ~~SECRET~~

Like you I am anxious about Russia and also China
in the next few months. It is often easier to see
dangers gathering than to have the power to ward them
off, and very often they don't happen.

Mountbatten will explain to you some of the prac-
tical difficulties as we see them here of a medium
scale operation this year. We are still working at it
and trying to make plans to overcome them. All
preparations should go forward with the utmost speed,
and I am having your new convoy proposals examined by
the Chiefs of Staff and the Admiralty.

I had some very pleasant talks with Arnold, though
I am still much troubled on the subject.

I hope you were pleased with our mass air attack
on Cologne. There is plenty more to come, and I look
forward eagerly to the arrival of your bombing groups.

The battle in Libya goes well, and I expect
considerable results or even possibly a complete decision.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

~~SECRET~~

Action Copy

DRAFT OF BEGINNING OF A MESSAGE

Rough draft May 31, 1942.
of NO. 152

TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON

1. I am thrilled at the thought of the books and shall always cherish them.
2. I have sent the invitations to Smuts and Curtin, the latter not expected until after he has seen Evatt.
3. Molotov's visit is, I think, a real success because we have got on a personal footing of candor and as good friendship as can be acquired through an interpreter. His departure will be delayed two or three days more.
4. He has made very clear his real anxiety as to the next four or five months, and I think this is sincere and not put forward to force our hand. *A*
5. Therefore, I am more than ever anxious that Bolero proceed to definite action beginning in *1942 - B* ~~August~~ and continuing *[*as long as the weather holds.*]*

TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON (cont.)

6. After talking with ^{our} [the] Staff, I believe German Air Forces cannot be ^{C.} [eliminated without preliminary or temporary efforts by ground forces in order to force German planes into the air. If this phase can be started early in August, it will result in either:]

(a) Pulling German Air Forces away from Russian front, with effort to destroy it on our part, or

(b) If German Air Force fails to come out, the ground troop operation can be increased with objective of establishing permanent positions.

7. United Staffs are now working on proposal to

increase shipping for use in Bolero by cutting out a

large portion of materials for Russia ^{other than munitions} [which could not be manufactured until 1943.] *which can be used in battle this year.*

This ought not to diminish

supplies of munitions like planes, tanks, guns, ammunition,

which Russians could use in combat this Summer. I think

we can cut ^{we} [a little] further on Memansk-Archangel convoys

and send more ready to use munitions via Basra.

This should make your Home Fleet, particularly destroyers:

TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON (cont.)

8. I will telegraph you when Molotov leaves, and I am especially anxious that he carry back some real results of his Mission and that he will give a favorable account to Stalin. I am inclined to think that at present all the Russians are a bit down in the mouth.

But the important thing is that we may and probably are faced with real trouble on the Russian front and must make our plans to meet it.

Roosevelt

✓ 4) (A) I have a very strong feeling that the Russian position is precarious and may grow steadily worse during the coming weeks.

5) (B) We all realize that because of weather conditions the operations cannot be delayed until the end of the year..

6) (C) defeated or indeed brought to battle to an extent which will bring them off the Russian front until we have made a landing.

I have great confidence in the ability of our joint airforces.

to gain ^{complete} control of the channel
and enough of the land for
appropriate bridge heads to be
covered. This will result in
either

1 LCR
1:45 AM/3rd
tnp

CABLEGRAM

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

June 2, 1942

8:22 P M.

From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 97

From Former Naval Person to President. ~~Most secret~~
and personal No. 97 . Most grateful about Washington .
Rodney can now sail forthwith.

Prime

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

LCR-SC-2
FILED 7P/3
BVC

CABLE

CSWD

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

June 3, 1942

1:00 P.M.

From LONDON

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
To WHITE HOUSE

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 98, June 3, 1942

From former Naval person to President.
Number 98. Personal thank you so much for the
souvenir sent with your letter of the 7th May.

Prime

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The P.M. sent you this personal
line:

"Thank you so much for the
souvenir sent with your letter seventh
May." Signed Prime

GGT

LCR 1
filed 820p/4
ett

CSWD

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

June 4, 1942

~~SECRET~~

8:35 P.M.

From London

To The President of The United States
Map Room, The White House

Copies furnished as noted:

99

I must tell you that we received invaluable help from Winant during our Russian negotiations. He made the Russians understand as no one else could do how injurious to good relations between us three must have been the American reaction to the old treaty I have no doubt that his intervention and plain speaking were largely instrumental in helping us to secure a treaty which fulfilled our own ideas we are all most grateful for his help.

Prime Minister

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

AMDI 2
519P/7
AEL

CSWD

~~SECRET~~
Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

June 7, 1942

URGENT

11:33 AM M.

From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 85, June 7th

Msg. No. 100 from Former Naval Person to
President Roosevelt. Personal and secret your
No. 154.

I have today telegraphed to Lyttelton
approving the proposals for combined production
and resources board, and I entirely concur in
simultaneous announcement on Monday or Tuesday.


PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


June 5, 1942

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON, FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON

NO. 153 PRIORITY

REFER MY NUMBER 152 DISTINGUISHED VISITOR
DEPARTED WASHINGTON NOON FOUR JUNE REGARDS

ROOSEVELT

Released at 7:45, EWT, June 5, 1942,
directed to do so by Captain J.L.
McCrea, Naval Aide, over phone.

Joseph D. Coffee, Jr. - Watch Officer
Joseph D. Coffee, Jr.
Ensign, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date OCT 12 1971

AMDI 7
filed 616 p/13
ett

CSWD

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

June 13, 1942

12:43 P. M.

From London

To The President of The United States
The White House, Map Room

~~SECRET~~

Copies furnished as noted:

#XXXC 87, June 13, 1942

Former Naval person to President. Personal and secret.

Number 101.

Very many thanks for your number 156 PS I had a long talk with Mountbatten last night, and in view of the impossibility of dealing by correspondence with all the many difficult points outstanding, I feel it is my duty to come to see you. I shall hold myself ready to start as weather serves from Thursday 18th onwards and will advise you later. I shall bring C I G S, General Brooke, whom you have not yet met, with me, also General Ismay. My own personal group will be; Tommy and John Martin. Colonel White thanks you very much for the invitation, by which she is complimented, but thinks she had better stay here on account of her Russian fund.

Please let plan be secret till we arrive.

This is the moment for me to send you my heartiest congratulations on the grand American victories in the Pacific which have very decidedly altered the balance of the Naval war. All good wishes to you and friends.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

Prime

MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

#154
June 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Nelson and Lyttelton are anxious to get a Combined Production and Resources Board going similar to our other combined boards. I think it has a good deal of merit.

The exact powers of the Board could be agreed upon over the week end.

I will have a memorandum for you today relative to the exact powers proposed by Lyttelton and Nelson, but it seems to me this wire might go at once because you will want to get the Prime Minister's formal approval. I am sure it is all right with him.

H.L.H.

OK
FJR